In relations between South Korea and China, something is emerging that can significantly worsen relations between Seoul and Beijing. We are talking about information disseminated by pro-American NGOs that China allegedly not only interferes in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, but also keeps “secret police stations” there. These police stations, if these bombshell statements are to be believed, are something like secret CIA prisons.
In September 2022, the Madrid-based advocacy group Safeguard Defenders released a report accusing the Chinese government of running more than 100 “secret police stations” around the world, including at least one in South Korea.
Safeguard Defenders is led by Swedish human rights activist Peter Dahlin, who was detained in China in 2016 and deported to his homeland. His NGO China Action formally trained human rights and civil liberties lawyers, but in reality collected negative information about the situation in China, which was then distorted and transferred abroad for publication in “human rights reports.” In addition, the personnel trained by the organization “intervened in acute social problems, provoking citizens to organize anti-government protest rallies”.
The report claims that the CCP’s United Front Work Department (UFWD, 中共中央 统一战线 工作 部), which coordinates “influence operations” in China and abroad, is behind the activities of more than one hundred secret police departments that the NGO has detected in 53 countries. They are allegedly called “110 Overseas Police Service Stations” after the Chinese police emergency number 110.
This department was established during the Chinese Civil War and was re-established in 1979 under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Since 2012, under Xi Jinping, the role and scope of UFWD has expanded and intensified. The department is believed to be working with diasporas and pro-Chinese NGOs, coordinating lobbying activities for Beijing.
However, anti-Chinese propaganda ascribes clandestine diplomatic activity to the department, recalling that, in accordance with the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the establishment of a “vice consulate or consular office” without the consent of the host country is a violation of international law. Chinese authorities allegedly claim that UFWD’s “under cover” facilities operate voluntarily, offering services such as document renewals for overseas Chinese citizens. But the Western NGO believes that the main function of these institutions is to ensure the loyalty of Chinese citizens living in this or that country and to pressure Chinese dissidents to return to China and face criminal charges. “The tools they use to do this are similar to the North Korean practice” – going to the extent of kidnapping people and then secretly sending them to China. Here, of course, examples would be good, but traditionally the Sinophobes did not provide any.
Safeguard Defenders claimed that in South Korea and several other countries, a Chinese government agency used Chinese students who study at local universities as “liaison officers”.
According to the NGO, more than 10 countries have launched investigations into what could be a violation of international law and an infringement of national sovereignty, and in some countries the existence of unauthorized Chinese police stations has been officially confirmed by government authorities. The Dutch government has announced that two such sites found in Amsterdam and Rotterdam are currently closed; another store in Dublin was also closed by the Irish government.
The Chinese Foreign Ministry denies such claims. According to Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Mao Ning, the so-called overseas police stations simply do not exist. A spokesman for the Chinese embassy in Seoul also said that the Safeguard Defenders report was baseless and that “there is no such thing as the so-called overseas police stations.”
However, the well-known conservative newspaper The Chosun Ilbo reported that counterintelligence agencies had suspicions about a Chinese restaurant in southern Seoul due to a suspicious profit stream and a sudden suspension notice after a report by “security advocates” attracted international attention.
After that, on December 20, 2022, South Korean authorities were forced to launch an investigation, as the hype had already reached a high level, and the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that any foreign agencies operating here must act in accordance with the relevant domestic and international laws. Safeguard Defenders immediately offered to help, and the media began to provide information, hinting that the case was almost solved. For example, The Korea Times, the main English-language newspaper of South Korea, put it this way: “Media reports accusing China of operating covert police stations overseas, including at least one in South Korea, have now gathered significant evidence for further investigation, and more than a dozen countries are currently investigating these allegations”.
What is known at the moment? On the one hand, both the police and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are involved in the investigation, on the other hand, in a conversation with The Korea Times, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Lim Soo-suk stated that “all governments, including the Chinese government, must respect the rule of law in South Korea,” but he declined to disclose any information about the ongoing investigation.
On December 23, the Dongpangmyeongju restaurant announced that it would cease operations, but the closure was not related to the news of the covert police stations, and on December 29, its representative, Chinese citizen Wang Haijun, issued a rebuttal, saying that the restaurant was an ordinary place of business until speculation surfaced. “A corrupt company is controlling public opinion with money and fooling Korean people and destroying the friendship between Korea and China by manipulating Korean politics”. Wang said he would take legal action against all media outlets that disclosed personal information about him and his family, including photographs associated with them.
At the same time, The Chosun Ilbo, which readers may remember as one of the well-established purveyors of fake news about North Korea, first published an article citing an unnamed source saying that the South Korean government was investigating a Chinese restaurant in Seoul’s Gangnam district as a possible secret police station, and then it presented yet another allegation. It turns out that when the former Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohun and his wife were invited by the then Governor of South Chungcheong Province, Ahn Hee-jung, to spend the night in a condominium in 2017, they brought a woman with them who wrote to Ahn and invited him to a “second round of tea,” implying sexual intercourse.
Ahn Hee-jung, as we recall, was found guilty of raping his secretary in 2019, becoming the first #MeToo victim in South Korea. Testifying against him in 2018, the victim also recalled this episode, stating that at the time she had the governor’s smartphone and saw a text message from a Chinese woman. So, sensing a political risk, the secretary spent the night in the hallway to stop her boss in case he tried to “go for tea.” But because the media at the time was heavily focused on Ahn’s sexual harassment of his secretary, “the alleged Chinese embassy plot was not made public” with only The Chosun Ilbo now finally breaking the news.
The Chinese Embassy in Seoul denied this fake information, releasing a statement that read “the report is fabricated, deliberately slanderous and contrary to etiquette.” Other media outlets, notably The Korea Times, were also unable to confirm these claims.
However, in doing so, The Korea Times found something that made the situation more ambivalent. Firstly, Wang is the president of the headquarters of the Korea China Overseas Association (KCOAH) and the China-Korean Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CKCPPNR), and he is also the director of the Overseas China Service Center in South Korea. The restaurant he represented is the residence of the Wang-led KCOAH and CKCPPNR, which have strong ties to Beijing. In 2021, the Chinese Ambassador to South Korea Xing Haiming visited the groups on an inspection tour to supervise their work.
Secondly, the newspaper found out that the idea of what was billed as a “secret Chinese police station” is an initiative by the government of the Chinese city of Nantong (a suburb of Shanghai) to set up overseas branches to protect its citizens from crime and solve security problems. In addition, this initiative aims to monitor Chinese citizens abroad who are suspected of financial crimes and collect information about their whereabouts outside China. So far, the center has jointly processed more than 120 requests for help in cases of all kinds, assisted in the capture and conviction of more than 80 suspects, and issued more than 1,500 warning messages, according to the newspaper.
In a press release dated November 26, 2021, the Nantong government confirmed that there was a branch in South Korea where a new representative had been appointed. In May 2022, Nantong Police announced that it would expand the center to provide services related to driving licenses and identity documents. According to a July news report, the Nantong police also recruited Chinese students and other Chinese citizens in South Korea as liaisons.
Thus, there is some kind of police support center in South Korea. However, the newspaper emphasizes that there is no evidence to support the claim that the Chinese restaurant in the south of Seoul was its branch. And the author can add that there is no evidence that the said center kidnapped or terrorized dissidents.
As you can see, no real evidence of the existence of “secret police stations” on the territory of South Korea was presented to us, despite the fact that these allegations again have become a pretext for repressive actions. There are no proven cases of interference in elections or political lobbying, much less seeking out dissidents or applying pressure on Chinese citizens living in South Korea. The author believes that if the “human rights activists” had at least some evidence, they would have no qualms about sharing it. The Chosun Ilbo is not particularly different from the “democratic press” in this sense, turning the information “the police were forced to launch an investigation amid the hype” into “the police and counterintelligence officials proved Chinese machinations and agents of influence are about to be arrested.”
On the other hand, there is no smoke without fire. Organizations that unite Chinese citizens in South Korea exist and work in conjunction with the embassy, although it is not clear to what extent. Both in Russia and in South Korea there is a practice of appointing a person as an “honorary consul.” But it is understandable that anti-Chinese NGOs have a “ human rights concern” that such structures are under the control of the United Front and that they cooperate with the security agencies.
Thirdly, information from “human rights activists” successfully struck anti-Chinese sentiments in South Korea itself. In this regard, there is also irritation due to the fact that during the reign of Moon Jae-in, relations between the two countries never returned to the level of “non-sanctions” imposed for THAAD. And there is also fear of the rich and influential Chinese diaspora. As well as other rumors about the political lobbying conducted by China (for example, through the Confucius Institutes, which other pro-American NGOs oppose). And the expectation of a situation where, against the backdrop of further confrontation between Washington and Beijing, Seoul will have to make a choice.
It is clear what choice this will be, but it is easier to make it if there is a reason to “strike an attitude” and say that we would like to cooperate, but a terrible event has occurred that is forcing us to “reset to 0.” Similarly, the government of Lee Myung-bak used the sinking of the Cheonan corvette in order to break the agreements that were inconvenient for the Conservatives, although the official version accusing North Korea was simply riddled with holes, which was rather painfully obvious.
The United States media has been writing about such a “pernicious influence of China” for a long time, trying to rock the boat and cut off the channels of China’s foreign cooperation, and the author will carefully observe how the investigation ends and whether the inflating of this story will trigger a significant cooling of South Korea-China relations.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia, the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
