27.10.2022 Author: Vladimir Terehov

Pakistan’s domestic turbulence raises question about the reliability of storing its nuclear arsenal

The rapidly evolving situation around Pakistan does not allow attention to be diverted to developments in other equally important areas of the Indo-Pacific region. It should be recalled that it is a country with a very mixed (mostly in ethnic terms) population of around 220 million people that possesses an arsenal of nuclear weapons, the composition of which is only subject to more or less plausible assessments.

The one thing that is not in doubt is that Pakistan has it. And it was this that prompted US President Joe Biden to highlight with considerable concern the very fact of increasing domestic political turbulence in the country in question. This was perceived negatively by the object of this kind of attention, as it was seen as interference in the affairs of a sovereign country.

So, on October 13 this year, during a certain US election campaign event, J. Biden called Pakistan “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” because its nuclear weapons are stored “without any cohesion”. A day later, further confirmation of the substantive validity of such harsh language came when a certain former local judge was killed by separatist militants in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The act itself was carried out in a mosque, probably by fellow believers with the deceased while the latter was performing his prayers. This in itself is no small measure of the level of conflict (the word “cohesion” seems inappropriate here) in a number of regions of the country.

But, again, Islamabad’s official reaction to the aforementioned “external” statement of a more or less obvious situation inside the country was expectedly negative. The day after J. Biden’s remarks were made public, the US Ambassador was summoned to talk to the Pakistani Foreign Ministry. On October 15, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, in a social media post, explained that his country was very responsible about the conditions for storing nuclear assets. The conditions themselves, he said, were fully compliant with IAEA requirements.

The US Department of State has joined in trying to prevent a suddenly awkward bilateral situation from developing. On October 17, Vedant Patel, Principal Deputy Spokesperson for the US Department of State (a 33-year-old Indian by birth, making his public debut in the post) went into unnecessary detail in response to a simple and understandable request from a journalist to comment on the above remark by J. Biden. In the end, it was possible to extract words from the budding official that “the United States is confident of Pakistan’s commitment and its ability to secure its nuclear assets”.

Nevertheless, another day later, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff (the “all-powerful”) General Javed Bajwa addressed the subject. This was done on the occasion of summing up the results of an inspection of one of the army corps on not only readiness for immediate tasks, but also assistance to the civil administration in dealing with the consequences of the catastrophic flooding. Among other things, satisfaction was expressed with the state of the whole set of issues that accompanies the very fact that the country has the nuclear arsenal.

Islamabad did not miss an opportunity to point the finger at neighboring India for Washington as a more appropriate object for expressing concerns about the secure storage and operation of its nuclear missile arsenal. Speaking to reporters, Pakistani Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, recalled the “accidental” launch of a BrahMos missile by the Indian Air Force into Pakistani territory six months ago. At the time, both sides considered it possible to “hush up” the unpleasant incident.

Meanwhile, the situation inside Pakistan itself continues to escalate, with a struggle between two political factions at its center. Of these, one is led by former prime minister and Movement for Justice Party leader Imran Khan. The second is Shehbaz Sharif, who succeeded him in early April, and the Pakistan Democratic Movement party coalition behind him, with the Pakistan Muslim League (N) as its main actor.

Another round of infighting between these factions was triggered by the October 16 by-elections for both the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, and the local unicameral parliament in the largest province, Punjab. The latter is home to about 40% of Pakistan’s total population. Though in quantitative terms, the “cost of the issue” of the elections was very modest (8 out of a total of 342 seats in the National Assembly and 3 out of a total of 371 in the Punjab parliament), the outcome was nevertheless crucial in demonstrating “into whose sails the winds of popular sentiment blow”.

And the answer to this question turned out to be quite definite, namely in favor of I. Khan’s coalition. It won 6 of the 8 seats in the National Assembly and 2 of the 3 seats in the Punjab parliament. The MfJ’s failure in the National Assembly elections in a constituency in the Sindh capital, Karachi, was publicly linked by I. Khan to “massive fraud” in the counting of votes.

Be that as it may, the announced results of the last election sharply reinforce the former prime minister’s basic position, both in his assessment of the nature of the ongoing political crisis in the country, and on the way it will be resolved. As early as the spring of this year, i.e. at a time of yet another deterioration in the domestic political situation, I. Khan was quite clear (and continues to be so to this day) that there was a significant aspect of “external” intervention in the very genesis of the crisis, with a transparent hint of Washington.

The resolution of the aggravated issue of power was proposed to be handed over to its bearer, i.e. the people. To this end, according to I. Khan, it was necessary to hold regular general elections to parliament immediately (i.e. one year before the calendar deadline). Their results were meant to answer the above question.

However, the then opposition, i.e. the current political authorities, preferred to put the question of confidence in I. Khan’s government to a parliamentary vote. This ended in success for it only at the expense of the votes of a few defectors from the latter’s camp. However, the results of the by-elections that have just taken place significantly reinforce Khan’s original thesis on the need to hold parliamentary elections immediately (i.e. without waiting for the “calendar” deadline that falls on the summer of next year).

This thesis will be central to the slogans of the already announced nationwide mass march of the former prime minister’s supporters. It could start over the coming weekend in October and is already being described in the media as “prolonged”. That is, its duration is not limited in time by the organizers. Something similar happened during the (also “prolonged”) march held by supporters of I. Khan a month and a half after his resignation. The country was then almost on the brink of civil war.

As for the forthcoming march, there are already worrisome assessments of its possible nature. As for the extent of support that I. Khan enjoys in the country, it is characterized by the words of the Chief Minister of the same province of Punjab about his readiness to carry out any orders of the former. The unequivocal “warnings” to the participants in the forthcoming march by the present Minister of Interior, however, were followed by an allegation that I. Khan enjoys massive support in other provinces of the country as well.

In other words, the US President’s concerns expressed above about Pakistan’s domestic situation, especially in terms of its impact on the safe storage of its nuclear arsenal, did not come out of nowhere. And it is in everyone’s interest that the current domestic political crisis does not become a threat to the integrity of the country.

Russia, which seeks to maintain normal relations with any legitimate government in Pakistan, has as much interest in doing so as anyone else. Incidentally, the current Minister of Finance, Ishaq Dar, has said his country is ready to buy Russian oil and oil products (“at Indian prices”). It is a good indication of similar reciprocal aspirations of Pakistan’s leadership.

Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.