In the history of relations between the two now leading Asian powers, the PRC and Japan, the date of September 29 marks a very remarkable event. On this day exactly 50 years ago, Prime Ministers Zhou Enlai and Kakuei Tanaka signed the nine-point Joint Communiqué. The first one stated an end to “the abnormal state of affairs” between the PRC and Japan.
It should be added that this very “abnormality” emerged at the end of July 1937 with the outbreak of the “Second Sino-Japanese War”. Some historians link this date (rather than September 1, 1939) with the start of World War II in general. After the end of that war (and hence the aforementioned Sino-Japanese conflict), it took another 22 years to restore the bilateral diplomatic relations that had been broken off in 1937. This was substantially due to the fact that almost immediately after World War II the Cold War began, in which the PRC and Japan found themselves in opposing military and political camps.
One of these formations began however a gradual but increasingly radical transformation with the death of its leader, Joseph Stalin, which eventually engendered its split up. China was becoming increasingly independent of the socialist camp and this contributed to a gradual improvement in relations with the US and Japan, with the latter being manifestly swifter in the process than the former.
It is worth stressing once again the determining role that the Yoshida Doctrine (named after the Japanese Prime Minister from 1946-1954) played in that process and in all other aspects of postwar Japan’s life. At that time, a key provision of the constitution that was actually imposed by the occupation authorities, namely Article 9 of that instrument (which has remained unchanged to this day), was used to the advantage of Japan. The benefit was seen in avoiding involvement in armed conflicts for as long as possible, concentrating on rebuilding and developing the economy as a basic tool for ensuring the well-being of the country’s own population and gaining the necessary weight in international affairs.
Having effectively handed over to Washington (which had become a key ally) the problems of defense and security, bypassing the armed conflicts involving the US (in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf), Japan began to buy up licenses (mainly from the US) for the manufacturing of modern products and organizing their production and marketing. And at first, the main foreign market in which these products were sold was still in the US.
However, at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, Tokyo (once again) drew attention to the fact that, very close by, there was a huge area in terms of size and population, which could well become an extremely attractive market. There have been renewed attempts to exploit it, “but in a different way”. What they call “Clausewitz in reverse”.
However, Japan had its own conceptual framework for a strategy for dealing with its neighbors on the continent. The so-called “Four Asian Tigers” (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore), and indeed China itself, were in no small part a result of the Japanese flying geese paradigm back in the 1930s.
In any case, by the second half of the 1960s, Washington was unpleasantly surprised to discover that while the US was tirelessly fighting “international communism”, a key Asian ally was making a dent in the united front of that struggle. This has been demonstrated, for example, by the functioning of a trade and economic mission in Beijing, which was not much different from a full-fledged embassy. In this connection, Henry Kissinger is allegedly (and, of course, not publicly) credited with uttering very unflattering words about Japan at the time.
However, the conclusion they drew was correct. Namely, not to plug the gap, but to use it to achieve their own goals while fighting this same “communist threat”. This is what Henry Kissinger did when he became National Security Advisor to the new President Richard Nixon in early 1969. At the same time, the political bargaining process with the then PRC leadership also involved playing the “Japan Card”, i.e. the supposedly inherent “historical fear of a resurgent Japan” among the Chinese.
But, again, in the process of improving relations with China, Tokyo was noticeably ahead of Washington. While Kissinger’s “ping-pong diplomacy” ended in February 1972 with the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué, which was a milestone but still an interim event in the process, six months later Japan and the PRC were in full diplomatic relations. The same was not established between Washington and Beijing until seven years later.
Among the other provisions of the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué mentioned above, it is important to note those whose relevance not only has not diminished over time, but has now increased dramatically and is already becoming one of the main challenges to the (highly desirable for all) effort of at least slowing down the deterioration of the political sphere in bilateral relations.
This is mainly a written record of Tokyo’s attitude towards the state system established in China at the end of 1949 and the government representing it, as well as the key foreign policy issue in Beijing, which is defined by the word “Taiwan”. Japan’s position on both of these issues is spelled out in paragraphs 2 and 3. Of these, the first is that “the Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” It should be noted that it could not have happened otherwise, that is, the act of establishing (and not “restoring”, which is also important to stress) diplomatic relations, as described in paragraph 4, would not have taken place.
And what about Taiwan, which Japan had owned since 1895 (a period still warmly remembered on the island), the “Republic of China” based there, and the latter’s “government”? No way. This is how the entry in paragraph 3 can be characterized which states that “the Government of Japan fully understands and respects” the position of the PRC Government expressed in the same paragraph that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory.”
It’s as if an interlocutor, from whom you need to get a clear endorsement of some of your intentions, mumbles “uh-huh” in response. But the fact is that even this interjection is heard less and less frequently from Tokyo today.
Beijing not only had to agree to Japan’s position on one of its most important issues in that instrument back then, but also had to give up its demand for reparations as a result of World War II with paragraph 5. The difficult situation at the time, and above all the growing confrontation with the USSR, demanded the immediate establishment of normal relations with the rapidly developing Japan.
“The Taiwanese sore”, implicit in this instrument, was virtually silent during the first three decades of a very fruitful bilateral relationship. First of all, in the above mentioned trade and economic sphere.
By the early 2000s, however, two trends started emerging which led to a renewal of the “phantom-historical” pains. The first one stems from China’s establishment as a new global power; the second is the realization in Japan that the Yoshida Doctrine has run out of steam and that there is a need to “become like everyone else” by abandoning any self-restraint (i.e., the famous constitutional Article 9) in the defense and security sphere.
Both countries’ interests already overlap in the Southeast Asian sub-region. The issue of ownership of the five uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is getting increasingly acute. The NEO has also consistently noted Tokyo’s activism in Taiwan, where the Japanese are met in turn with the friendliest of welcoming embraces. A major item on Taipei’s foreign policy agenda recently was attending the funeral of Japanese Prime Minister Abe, “a great friend of Taiwan.”
But again, the growing problematic nature of China-Japan relations is not confined to the Taiwan issue, and certainly cannot be explained by the notorious “US intrigues” alone.
And yet things continue to look brilliant in the trade and economic sphere. Bilateral trade is growing steadily and at an impressive rate (its volume could reach $400 billion this year), and the same is true for annual investments in the partner’s economy. By the way, the picture of US-China relations looks roughly the same, in which the spheres of politics vs trade and economic relations also make the impression of being at opposite ends.
Masakazu Tokura, chairman of the powerful Japanese Keidanren business federation, praised the outcome of an online meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang a week before the big day.
Nevertheless, probably the most important question debated in Japan on the eve of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations with the PRC was whether the two countries were now hostile or friendly. As it should be, the experts’ texts in reputable publications on the search for an answer are politically correct.
But the figures quoted therein, which characterize the average man’s perception of the neighboring nation, look quite bad. And this is especially true of the Japanese attitude towards the Chinese. Although over the past year there has been an increase in negativity from the latter towards the former.
The lack of “unorganized” public rejoicing in both countries on the occasion of the said round anniversary is therefore not surprising.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
