Alas, the everyday wisdom of “misfortunes never coming alone” finds its confirmation in the world of politics as well. The author’s first reaction to news of a natural cataclysm of unprecedented proportions in Pakistan also boiled down to a popular saying, “They could have really done without that.”
For Pakistan is on its way to being moved to the ranks of those losers who have been particularly unlucky in the current phase of the “Great Game.” The latter is becoming extremely uncomfortable for all without exception, but it is hitting some way harder than others.
Regarding Pakistan, it should be recalled that the domestic political situation in that country, which is more or less always in a state of turbulence of varying intensity, sharply deteriorated in the spring of this year. On April 9, former Prime Minister Imran Khan, who had held the post since the summer of 2018 (following a successful general election for his Movement for Justice (MfJ) party at the time), was ousted by parliament.
It is important to note that the opposition succeeded in securing such a decision only with the votes of a few defector MPs from the MfJ faction. However, given that the former Prime Minister retained his popularity with the masses, domestic political tensions could already be foreseen even back then. Despite positive appeals made to Khan’s supporters by the new Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif,
they were, as expected, ignored, mainly for two interrelated reasons. First, Imran Khan proposed that the crisis should not be resolved by a parliamentary vote, but by holding snap general elections, which are “scheduled” for next summer. Second, he has stated publicly more than once that the very worsening of the crisis in the country was provoked by “external forces,” clearly meaning the US. This, however, has not been proven.
But even without any proof, numerous supporters of the former Prime Minister undertook several mass events in major cities in the second half of May, which were not without “some excesses.” Moreover, Imran Khan again did not restrain himself much in his speeches to supporters. Even then, there were clear hints from government sources of the possibility of prosecution, both for himself and for his closest partners in the MfJ, and under particularly grave articles “in connection with calls for sedition.”
In this way, the “Imran Khan problem” would not receive a one-time, short-term solution, but a radical one. For it is almost certain that he and the leaders of the protest movement in general would be blocked from the path to a very likely return to power in a year’s time in the next general election mentioned above.
However, they did not dare to do so at the time, apparently waiting for a more appropriate moment and excuse. Both presented themselves after two months, with the occasion (in fact, much more important than a street riot) arising from the inherent specificity of Pakistan’s internal political order, which is defined by the word “Army.”
It is important to note a very important feature of this “specificity” that has emerged in recent times. It is not only the military leadership that has a significant influence on the domestic political life, but also the various political factions in the country, which are more or less always in sharp contention and seek to secure support from the military.
So, in early August, a helicopter crashed with fatal consequences for one of the top army commanders on board. Pro- and anti-government forces immediately tried to take advantage of this, both to fight their opponents and to win the sympathy of the military.
So far, the official authorities have had better luck, on whose behalf Shahbaz Gill, a close associate of Imran Khan in the MfJ, was arrested on August 9. With reference to some of Gill’s words on a private TV channel in connection with the disaster, he was accused of the same “calls for sedition.” He was also accused of “discrediting the army,” once again presented as a pillar of internal political stability.
But the “Army” factor is beginning to take on special relevance in Pakistan for another reason. In November this year, the term (already extended twice) of General Javed Bajwa at the helm will come to an end. He is a very iconic figure in contemporary Pakistani politics. It is his name that the now popular meme of a “radical turn towards the West” in Pakistani politics under the country’s new government is associated with.
Which this new government is hardly aware of. For the new Prime Minister’s first messages abroad reaffirmed his commitment to developing relations with the PRC (and Russia), as these relations are not determined by personalities in power but by factors of an objective nature.
In the current context of the escalating “Great Game,” such a “U-turn” would mean a break with a de facto key ally in the PRC. Alas, “running between the streams” of global political rain will not be possible today. And why even trigger such a break after many decades of fruitful bilateral cooperation? This is evidenced, for example, by the implementation of the ambitious China-Pakistan Industrial and Infrastructure Economic Corridor. The same Shehbaz Sharif expressed support for it in his first statements.
Pakistan’s defense sector itself already relies heavily on the “Chinese base.” It is worth mentioning the ceremony (attended by Imran Khan, by the way) held in early March of induction of the first batch of Chinese J-10C fighters into the country’s Air Force. Their characteristics are not inferior to those of US F-16s and French Rafale of the latest modifications. The Pakistani Navy’s fleet of ships is already almost entirely of Chinese origin. In the first half of this year, it included two fully modern Chinese Type 054A/P frigates (out of a planned total of 4), which in mid-July (i.e. under the new Pakistani government) took part in a joint exercise with the Chinese Navy, near Shanghai.
What can even the all-powerful General Bajwa, who (again, allegedly) is about to “turn around” the country in the aforementioned manner, do to counter these and other objective facts? And, in fact, who says he even has such intentions? Oh, he called US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman and went to London? That simply just isn’t enough.
Especially since reports emerge of his presidential ambitions after leaving the military. As a civilian he will have to get used to a completely new range of tasks, of which the main problem (as with all particularly unlucky players) is getting money, somehow. And not just for a lavish lifestyle, but just to get by. At least to pay long-standing debts. The “price tag” is in the range of just over one billion dollars. Is the honored general going to risk the future of his country for that?
Then again, what help can he expect today from, say, the British, who are increasingly concerned about saving on everything, including basic necessities and even personal hygiene? Besides, their pockets have long been emptied (by those Javed Bajwa spoke to) in order to “save Ukraine” and “preserve Taiwan’s democracy.”
Finally, the thesis about the “project” nature of the phenomenon called “Imran Khan” and the “closure” of the project itself by its initiators also needs to be commented on. If the “Imran Khan phenomenon” really was of an “army-project” nature, then it can be confidently asserted that this “project” turned out to be quite successful, and that its object today is living its own life, that is, completely independent of the “designers.” The leadership of Punjab, where half of Pakistan’s population lives, today gives its full support to Khan. Less explicitly, but similar support is evident in other regions of the country.
In other words, “getting things back to the way they were” (before the summer of 2018) will probably not be possible. If such intentions exist at all. Because former Prime Minister Imran Khan now carries no less weight on the Pakistani political scene than any of his current (potential) opponents.
This fact will also have to be taken into account because without the cooperation of all the internal forces it will be difficult (or even impossible) to overcome the consequences of the disaster mentioned at the beginning, which occurred in the form of an unprecedented overflow of the Indus River system. This was in turn caused by the unusually intense seasonal rains. “River of Life” turned out to be the cause of at least a thousand Pakistani deaths this time.
The consequences of the disaster have yet to be more or less fully assessed. But they already look like a national disaster that will require finding (again, “somehow”) not just a few, but probably tens of billions of dollars.
Incidentally, China was almost the first to show its willingness to help.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
