India is a big country with significant resources and a huge population. It has the third largest economy in Asia and the seventh largest in the world. But its geographical location also presents it with certain problems. Specifically, the Indian peninsula is largely cut off from the rest of the Eurasian landmass.
In the west it has borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. India and Pakistan see each other as enemies, and have a long-standing territorial dispute which has broken out into actual conflict on a number of occasions. And a considerable percentage of Pakistan’s population are ethnic Pashtuns – who also make up the bulk of the Taliban (an organization prohibited in the Russian Federation), which seized power in Afghanistan in 2021. Pakistani Pashtuns live primarily in the regions bordering on Afghanistan, and many of them sympathize with the Taliban’s objectives and frequently help Afghan militant groups enter Pakistan’s territory. Pakistan has its own division of the Taliban, and its leadership has contacts with Pakistan’s government. And now that the Taliban controls the whole of Afghanistan, it is in a position to support Pakistan’s government in its conflict with India.
India’s border with Afghanistan is a continuation of India’s border with China. China is the most powerful state in Asia and one of the most powerful states in the world, on a level with the self-appointed global hegemon – the USA. And China, like Pakistan, has a tense relationship with its neighboring superpower India. It isn’t just a question of contested territory: the two Asian giants are also in competition for economic and political influence in the region. Sandwiched between India and China are two smaller Himalayan states: Nepal and Bhutan. India is Bhutan’s main partner and ally – the two states work together on political, economic and military issues. In the past, Nepal was also a close partner of India, but in the last ten years Chinese influence has grown significantly in the former monarchy, a pro-Chinese government has come to power and Nepal is now firmly within China’s sphere of influence.
India’s land border with China, interrupted by Nepal and Bhutan, then continues westwards to the border with Myanmar. India’s relations with Myanmar have also been troubled in the past, but now the two countries have a fairly close partnership. Nevertheless, Myanmar has traditionally been strongly influenced by China, an influence that has grown in recent years: China is its main trade partner, the main investor in its infrastructure, and its main support in relations with the West, which imposed sanctions on Myanmar in response to the persecution of the Rohingya minority. India is not in a position to provide Myanmar with support of this kind, as it is closely allied with the US. Nevertheless India’s relations with Myanmar are good enough to provide it with overland access to the whole Indo-China region – Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia and Malaysia. The Indo-Chinese peninsula is cut off from the rest of the Eurasian landmass by China itself.
As a result, whatever the state of India’s relations with Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar, all land routes from India through these countries lead to China.
Thus, as already mentioned, as far as land routes are concerned, India is practically isolated from the rest of Eurasia, particularly from such significant partners as Russia and the EU – in all directions the path is blocked by India’s “enemies” – China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The latter country’s relations with India are still unclear, but it is likely to become an ally of Pakistan.
For the sake of completeness, India’s border with Bangladesh should also be mentioned, but, located as it is between India and Myanmar, it cannot provide India with a land routes to any other country.
Of course, India and China have not broken off their relations, and still have important trading links. In fact, China is India’s second most important partner after the USA. Nevertheless, India cannot afford to have its economy entirely dependent on its main rival. As is clear from the above, in order to diversify its trade and avoid isolation should its relations with China deteriorate, India is dependent of the sea. In particular, the Indian Ocean, which is crisscrossed with shipping routes linking India with the Middle East, Africa, Europe, the USA and other important regions. India’s economic power is largely due to its status as one of the leading Indo-Pacific nations. However, in the last few years this status has been threatened by China, whose influence is growing in the region.
In 2013 China launched its One Belt, One Road Initiative (OBOR), designed to unite the main global trade routes in a single system and thus vastly increase trade. It is now developing its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road – an extension of the OBOR which will bring together shipping routes. China’s main focus is on the shipping route linking Africa, the Middle East and Europe with the Pacific Ocean – a route which passes through the Indian Ocean and follows India’s coast. China started financing the construction of ports in various countries along the route, including in Myanmar, Sri-Lanka, Pakistan, Iran and various African countries. In exchange for generous investment in these countries, China frequently asks the governments in question to grant it long leases of the ports, or allow Chinese vessels privileged access rights.
Although China has insisted that these ports are solely intended for commercial shipping, India is concerned that they may be converted into Chinese Navy bases. These fears were confirmed in 2014 when a Chinese submarine docked in a port in Sri Lanka – too close for comfort to India’s southern coast. India saw that as proof that China was cementing its presence in the Indian Ocean in order to encircle India and thus be able to isolate it by sea as well as by land in the event of a serious conflict. That would have very serious consequences for India – for one thing, India’s manufacturing and power sectors are largely dependent on supplies of petrochemicals from the Middle East.
To avoid the risk of a blockade, however theoretical, India is developing its relations with other countries in the Indo-Pacific region that share its suspicions of China’s intentions and have a strong military. Fist of all, that means the US and its ally Japan, India’s long-term partner in the annual Malabar naval exercises, which views China with open hostility. In 2020 and 2021, Australia also took part in these exercises. But India is well aware that it needs to be cautious in building up relations with the US, as it does not want to be a tool in Washington’s hands. With this in mind, India is also taking care, independently of the US, to develop naval partnerships with other powers in the region.
For example, regional naval support was one of the main focus areas of the comprehensive strategic partnership between India and Indonesia, launched in May 2018.
Iran is another important Asian power with which India hopes to develop good relations in a bid to bolster its naval security.
Iran has been under US sanctions for a number of years because of its nuclear program. Despite pressure from the US to join in its sanctions against this or that country, India has always done business with Iran, and continues to do so.
India also cooperates with Iran on defense projects. For example, in March-April 2022 the two countries, together with France and Bangladesh, took part in the IMEX-22 joint naval exercises, held in Indian territorial waters in the Arabian Sea.
The IMEX exercises are a regular event organized by the members of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), which was established to promote naval cooperation between Indo-Pacific states on security matters.
India plays a leading role in the IONS, and its members include more than 20 countries in the Indo-Pacific region, including Iran, France (which has territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans), Australia, South Africa, the UAE and the ASEAN countries. The IONS is a voluntary grouping rather than a military alliance. Interestingly, China has the status of an observer in the IONS, and not of a full participant. In fact, the IONS could be described as a group of Pacific nations that share India’s concerns about Chinese naval activities. Even more significantly, the US – considered to be India’s main partner against China – is not a member of the IONS. The Indo-Pacific states seem to be using their meetings on the sidelines of IONS exercises (still low profile events in which no member is obliged to participate) to develop their own security arrangements for the Indo-Pacific region – arrangements that are not controlled by any global superpower.
It appears that the difficult geopolitical position that India finds itself in have compelled it to develop its own balanced foreign policy which can enable it to cooperate with its powerful neighbor China, counter China’s influence by working with the USA without becoming dependent on it, and also engage in joint projects with China and Russia. By surrounding itself with a group of like-minded Indo-Pacific nations, all of which are opposed to both US and Chinese hegemony, India has a chance to ensure its own security and maintain a balance of power in the region without aspiring to superpower status.
Dmitry Bokarev, political observer, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
