EN|FR|RU
Follow us on:

What Will a New Prime Minister Bring to Relations between Japan and The Republic of Korea?

Konstantin Asmolov, September 21 2020

6644

On 16 September 2020 Yoshihide Suga, the former Chief Cabinet Secretary of Japan, was appointed as the prime minister after Shinzo Abe retired due to chronic health problems.  Suga will head the ruling party until the end of September 2021, meaning until Shinzo Abe’s term of office expires. Then new elections will take place to elect a chair for the party for a three-year term.

71-year old Suga was the son of a strawberry farmer in Akita Prefecture, and the eldest son in the family, but then defied tradition by going to Tokyo instead of taking over the family business. Before enrolling in a university, he worked in a cardboard factory paying for his tuition while working part-time at the Tsukiji fish market.  In 1987, he became a deputy with the Yokohama City Council, and in 1966 he was elected to the lower house of the Japanese legislature. His persistence and toughness earned him the nickname “the Iron Wall”, and his motto is considered to be “Where there is a will, there is a way”.

Before Yoshihide Suga officially assumed the highest government office in Japan, he was known as the “shadow prime minister.”  Suga has been a staunch supporter of Abe since his first tenure as prime minister from 2006 to 2007. He also helped Abe with his return to power in 2012.

During the elections, Suga received 314 votes out of the 462 cast by members of Japan’s lower house in the legislature.  He received decisive support from five of the seven factions in the ruling party, surpassing Shigeru Ishiba, the former secretary general of the LDP, and Fumio Kishida, the former head of the LDP political council.

South Korean President Moon Jae-in has already sent a letter congratulating the new Japanese prime minister, and one in which he made it clear that Seoul is ready to hold a dialogue with Tokyo at any time. Moon proposed putting forth joint efforts to develop relations between the neighboring countries, and said that South Korea is “ready to sit down anytime with the government of Japan, which is the closest friend geographically and culturally, as well as sharing basic values and strategic interests…” The South Korean government plans to “cooperate actively with Prime Minister Suga and the new Cabinet, thus wisely overcoming the problem related to shared history and strengthening substantive cooperation in economic, cultural, and people-to-people exchange sectors in a forward-looking and mutually beneficial way.”

As prime minister, Suga has vowed to adhere to a course of Abenomics. But this author is much more interested in how the change in the Japanese prime minister will affect relations between Japan and Korea. Unlike Abe, Suga has almost never been abroad, and nobody knows what kind of diplomacy skills he has; however, judging by his statements Abe’s diplomatic acumen, including his personal friendship with president Donald Trump, is illustrious, and so he can turn to him for advice.  He did say, however, that he would pursue “his own style”, without going into any details.

As far as relations with South Korea are concerned, Suga has repeated Abe’s position that the 1965 treaty, under which Japan claims that all reparations related to the colonial era were completely and finally settled, must be the basis for bilateral relations.

In addition, we should remember how diplomatic squabbling between Tokyo and Seoul, Suga was the one who most frequently expressed Japan’s discontent with certain steps taken by the Republic of Korea.

Nonetheless, South Korean and other experts are actively discussing whether the change of leadership in Japan will be a stimulus that improves bilateral relations between it and Korea, which many of them believe are at their lowest level since diplomatic relations were established in 1965 due to a whole host of problems. First of all, there is the issue of reparations for colonial rule: Seoul has initiated a series of lawsuits to require Japanese firms to pay huge compensation to victims of colonial-era forced labor, while Tokyo believes that the 1965 treaty resolved all the relevant issues involved. The result was a trade war.

Seoul’s “sacrifice-centered” approach also manifests itself in how it is inflaming the issue of “comfort women”, and as a consequence Moon Jae-in has in effect disavowed the 2015 agreement.

One anonymous source who works in diplomacy told The Korea Times that “the deterioration in Korean-Japanese relations is having a very negative impact on our relations with both the United States and China. The worsening in bilateral relations is inflicting damage upon both countries, but we have suffered even more because of it. We need to see a tough response to what Japan is doing inappropriately. But to cope with our geopolitical reality we need to take a level-headed approach to promote our national interests.”

Will Japan’s policies change? There are differences of opinion. Nam Chang-hee, a professor of international politics at Inha University, believes that there may not be a big policy change under Suga. Patrick Cronin, Asia-Pacific Security Chair at the Hudson Institute, points out that Suga is not bound by any ancestral oath to change the Constitution of Japan; he he can support the common goals of having a strong and prosperous Japan, but he has more freedom in how those goals can be achieved.  And this means that there is the theoretical possibility of change.

Some experts stress the need for Seoul to take the initiative to start rebuilding bilateral trust. To do this, it needs to clear up the uncertainty surrounding the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA). In an interview with The Korea Times, Lief-Eric Easley, a professor at Ewha Womans University, said the attempt to rescind the agreement has undermined Seoul’s credibility not only in Tokyo, but also in Washington, Pyongyang, and Beijing. Washington views the GSOMIA as an essential component of trilateral security cooperation, especially in light of the continuing threats from North Korea, and with China growing stronger. “Rather than escalating legal battles, or demonizing Tokyo, Seoul should foster dialogue with civil society. Whipping up trade disputes with references to wartime history is counterproductive to reconciliation, not to mention damaging to an economy that is trying to recover from a global pandemic. ”

Patrick Cronin also thinks that “the Moon administration should seek a fresh beginning with Suga, because one good deed could start a virtuous cycle and produce a far more cooperative and forward-looking relationship between Seoul and Tokyo.” In this context, Moon and Suga could have a face-to-face meeting, since Seoul is pressing to hold the annual trilateral summit that Li Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, will also attend.

An editorial from The Korea Times put forth the idea that while Suga is unlikely to make any tangible efforts to forge ties with South Korea, that does not mean that Seoul and Tokyo should not do anything to improve relations. “Both sides should see the Abe’s resignation, and the appointment of his successor, as an opportunity to put an end to the hostilities and move on to friendship and partnership.” They should not be burning bridges, but just the opposite, and make every possible effort to narrow the differences in their views. It is true that “narrowing differences” means that the Japanese leadership “must first reflect on its shameful past, and then offer a sincere apology for the atrocities that were committed against Koreans and other Asians before and during WWII.”

And this quote is quite significant. In the opinion of this author, Japan’s new prime minister will not change anything, all the more so because, and this should be repeated, Suga was precisely who kept expressing Tokyo’s dissatisfaction with various actions taken by Seoul. For the two countries to get out of this crisis, Japanese policy is not what needs to change, but the course charted by Korea, where anti-Japanese sentiment remains a key component in government policy.

Konstantin Asmolov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, leading science associate of the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of the Far East of the RAS, specially for the internet magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.