Recently, the author reported about US-South Korea combined military drills that are usually held in March and April. North Korea has kept a close watch over the exercises that are linked to preparations for the transfer of wartime Operational Control Authority (OPCON) to the Republic of Korea (ROK) from the United States Forces Korea (USFK).
OPCON refers to the right to lead ROK forces and any joint operations with the Untied States if a war were to erupt on the Korean Peninsula. At the moment, the wartime operation control of the ROK military is in the hands of ROK/US Combined Forces Command (CFC). During the Korean War, the ROK President at the time, Syngman Rhee handed control of the South Korean military to the commander of the United Nations Command (UNC) in 1950. After the war, the Korean Armistice Agreement stipulated that the forces would remain under the UNC commander’s operational control to supposedly “lessen concerns in the United States” that the US military could, “against their will, be embroiled in a conflict initiated by South Korea”.
Hence, unusually, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (earlier, at all times but, nowadays, only during wars) will not be under the control of South Korea’s President and the Commander-in-Chief but the CFC, led, at present, by a four-star US general. This is why South Korea has been repeatedly described as a semi-sovereign state despite the fact that the ROK military is ranked in the top 10 based on its budget and is quite capable of dealing with its own issues. And in terms of their readiness, the armed forces have come a long way since the days of Syngman Rhee when South Korean servicemen were described as “frightened, confused and seemed inclined to flee the battlefield at any provocation”. In addition, if an opponent possesses even short- or medium-range missiles, chances are high that the US forces would be the first to be hit and may not be able to respond effectively. In fact, in conflicts of this nature, the United States is primarily concerned not with troops stationed overseas per se but the infrastructure that an indefinite number of US servicemen could be transferred to thanks to USA’s considerable military logistics capabilities if such a need arises.
In 1978, OPCON was transferred to ROK/US Combined Forces command, established the same year. On December 1, 1994, peacetime operational control (OPCON) of the ROK military was handed over to the Republic of Korea Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS) from the CFC. In 2003, the ROK “initiated talks on full OPCON transfer back to” South Korea after a proposal to do so was made during the ROK-US Annual Security Consultative Meeting. On February 24, 2007, South Korea’s Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense reached the OPCON transition agreement. The handover was set for April 17, 2012. However, due to an increased perceived “threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea,” the date was postponed to December 1, 2015.
During the United States-Republic of Korea Security Consultative Meeting in October 2014, the two sides agreed to delay the transfer of wartime control over ROK forces indefinitely until the following conditions were met. Firstly, the security environment on the Korean Peninsula as well as the region had to allow “for a stable transition”. Secondly, the South Korean military needed to demonstrate “its capacity for initial responses to the North’s nuclear and missile threats”. Thirdly, command and control capabilities of ROK Armed forces had to be enhanced before they could take over wartime OPCON. The readers have probably noticed that each of the conditions is quite open to interpretation.
In the realm of South Korean politics, left-wing forces and the South Korean leadership support the idea of handing over the control as soon as possible. The views held by conservatives and democrats on this issue are, in fact, quite similar. Key opponents are South Korea’s military leaders who do not wish to take on additional responsibility and take over tasks that the combined command is currently in charge of. The current US administration has not expressed any opposition to the handover of wartime command because its officials are probably more concerned with political aspects to do with retaining control over the military alliance between Washington and Seoul. They would, however, prefer South Korean troops were better prepared for the transition. And although Moon Jae-in, together with his government, hopes to complete the transfer of wartime operational authority during his term, i.e. by 2022, the United States does not seem to view the current ROK leadership as reliable allies and is, therefore, in no rush to proceed with the handover. It is first necessary to test how prepared the ROK military is for it during scheduled military drills.
“During the summertime exercise held in August 2019, Seoul and Washington conducted an initial operational capability (IOC) test”. And ROK Minister of National Defense and the US Secretary of Defense then “decided to move on to the FOC” (Full Operational Capability) test. Following the FOC test, the two sides plan to “carry out a Full Mission Capability (FMC) test”.
On June 3, 2019, a meeting between the head of South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, Jeong Kyeong-doo, and the acting US Secretary of Defense at the time, Patrick M. Shanahan, was held in Seoul. The two sides agreed to appoint a Korean four-star General to lead “the envisioned allies’ Combined Forces Command, after the wartime operational control is transferred to Seoul from Washington”.
Currently, the CFC is headed by a four-star US Army General whose Deputy Commander is a South Korean General of the same rank. The former is to serve as the deputy head of the future CFC. The US and ROK officials also decided to carry out the FOC test during the combined exercise in August 2020 under the future command structure. Initially, the South Korean Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was considered for the post of CFC head, but “the two sides viewed it would be too much of a burden for the official to take on more duties”.
On October 29, 2019, it was reported that Seoul and Washington began “discussions on new roles for each side when dealing with contingencies after the transfer of wartime operational control” to the ROK. According to a South Korean government source, an issue arose in the process.
Currently, the scope of US-ROK combined crisis management operations does not extend beyond the Korean Peninsula. The source reported that Washington had “proposed expanding it further to cover cases that the US” regarded as threats to its own national security. If Seoul were to accept it, the ROK military may have to “support or partake in overseas operations not directly related to” South Korea. These could include missions in the Strait of Hormuz and the South China Sea.
Apparently, South Korean military insiders “are concerned” about the proposal. In fact, Choi Hyun-soo, the Spokesperson of the Ministry of National Defense, said on November 4 that the reports about sending ROK troops to areas overseas viewed to be a threat by the United States after the OPCON transfer were not true.
In June 2020, there was a scandal over an article published by a South Korean newspaper, which was “heavily criticized” by the US Forces Korea (USFK) for its false speculations about the combined exercises held the previous year. Munhwa Ilbo, a daily newspaper in the ROK, reported in August 2019 that USFK Commander General Robert Abrams had “prematurely departed the Wartime Command Post” during the IOC test in August last year, as he had been “hugely disappointed with its progression”. The article also stated that USFK remained “skeptical about carrying out the FOC test to move the OPCON transfer-related process forward”. Then, it was reported that the General’s absence from an event to mark the Armed Forces Day in the ROK “could signal a possible rift in the South Korea-US alliance”. Later, it came to light that General Abrams’ mother-in-law had passed away on August 12, 2019, during the Combined Command Post Training, which is why he had left for “the United States immediately to be with his wife and family as they grieved this sudden passing”.
On July 28, 2020, ROK Ministry of National Defense announced that South Korea and the United States planned “to use an upcoming combined exercise to better prepare for Seoul to regain wartime operational control of its forces from Washington”. However, Chief Pentagon Spokesperson for the Department of Defense Jonathan Hoffman then stated that there would be “some changes to” the “exercise and maneuver efforts during COVID-19”. Aside from the FOC, “meant to verify whether Seoul is on course to meet the conditions for the envisioned OPCON transfer”, the drills are to focus on boosting capabilities of US and South Korean forces to launch a coordinated response to a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.
According to The Korea Times, South Korean “government’s goal to accomplish the transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) of the Korean military from Washington to Seoul by 2022 may face a setback as this year’s joint military exercises with the United States” could be scaled down to exclude the FOC verification due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some experts, like Professor of International Studies Park Won-gon, believe that US government officials do not “appear to favor the transfer of wartime OPCON when a conflict with China was mounting”. In such a climate, Washington “would want to retain influence on the Korean Peninsula”.
Hence, Moon Jae-in’s ambition to have wartime operational control over ROK forces in Seoul’s hands could remain unrealized due to the tense situation in the region.
Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D, Chief Research Fellow of the Center for Korean Studies, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook“.
