Last week, North Korea was visited by a high-profile South Korean delegation headed by National Security Office head Chung Eui-yong. During their two day stay in Pyongyang, members of the delegation had a number of talks with local political elites resulting in Chung Eui-yong making unexpected statements upon his arrival to Seoul, that proved to be sensational for the US media, when members of the delegation repeated them in Washington.
According to Chung Eui-yong, North Korean ruling elites have clearly expressed their readiness to renounce nuclear weapons should the security of their country be guaranteed by the elimination of the military threat that is looming on North Korea’s borders. However, those guarantees must be particularly sound since Pyongyang has stated time and time again that it never planned to use nuclear weapons offensively, as the main goal of their development was an attempt to restrain foreign players threatening North Korea with invasion. In addition, the North expressed its readiness to engage Washington in an open dialogue in order to establish bilateral relations and discuss the nuclear problem, while emphasizing that there would be neither test launches of ballistic missiles, nor new nuclear detonations conducted until the negotiations are over. Additionally, according to the South Korean National Security Office head Kim Jong-Un has unofficially expressed his desire to meet with US President Donald Trump to negotiate with him.
Initially, Trump would announce that he would accept the invitation, while revealing all further details about the meeting would be worked out at a later date. It’s no wonder that Western media sources have immediately gone haywire in anticipation of this historic meeting. However, it’s way too early for celebrations, as there’s a number of concerns that are clearly standing in the way of peaceful negotiations.
Firstly, we should recognize that the position occupied by Chung Eui-yong is rather shifty, as upon his arrival to South Korea his description of the position that Pyongyang matched all previous positions, however, as soon as he reached Washington, he hinted that the North was now prepared to surrender its nuclear power altogether. Perhaps Chung has said what he was expected to say in Washington, in order to spur the US-North Korean rapprochement that Seoul seeks. Moon Jae-in is well aware of the fact that inter-Korean progress is only possible by constantly appeasing the ego of the sitting US President.
Further more, although Trump has predictably described possible talks in his Twitter with a great deal of optimism, days later the White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders officially stated that Trump would not be meeting Kim Jong-Un unless the DPRK begins surrendering its nuclear weapons. She added that Washington was not going to take any friendly steps until the moment Pyongyang’s actions match its rhetoric. Generally speaking, this has been the typical reaction to any peaceful initiative that the DPRK has ever taken, summurized by the notion that Washington is going to consider all options only when North Korea has already capitulated to its demands.
Thirdly, Donald Trump can only meet with Kim Jong-Un in May, and there’s going to be a number of potentially volatile events that can affect decisions of all parties involved. First of all, Washington is planning to hold joint military exercises with South Korean armed forces on the Korean Peninsula, but apart from that, we can confidently expect additional unilateral measures aimed at pressuring the DPRK. Pressure is in response to accusations Kim Jong-Un poisoned his half-brother in Kuala Lumpur (we recall that the investigation is under way and that the DPRK’s guilt has not been officially confirmed at the moment). It is the reason for a new round of sanctions against North Korea on the pretext of Pyongyang supposedly using chemical weapons against its own citizens.
It should be understood that nobody really knows how America’s position on North Korea is formed and what American think-tanks are going to say, as there’s no small chance that Pyongyang’s gesture of good will may be interpreted as a gesture of desperation. If so then Washington is going to introduce all sorts of new sanctions against North Korea in an attempt for it to force its complete surrender at the negotiating table, yet it is unlikely that this approach will assist the parties involved in reaching a deeper understanding of each other.
Now, should the meeting between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-Un actually take place, Trump will become the first American president to ever talk to a Kim, which in itself would be no small achievement. But talks are not the ultimate goal, as they should lead to some agreements being signed. As in the case of the inter-Korean summit, the negotiations should end with something meaningful. As Reuters announced, while citing an anonymous source within the Trump administration, Washington will not accept anything less than the complete surrender of North Korea’s nuclear stockpiles.
It’s clear that a meeting without any deals being signed will be a political disaster for Trump, but if you’re familiar with Trump’s books on business strategy, Trump is only capable of a “dialogue” when he’s shoved his competitor in a corner to discuss his terms of surrender. So, what we can really expect is the two states presenting ultimatums to each other.
Under these circumstances there’s only one logical question: what can these parties possibly agree on? Let’s start with the alleged “concessions” that North Korea is willing to make. Since the task of creating strategic nuclear forces has been accomplished, it can easily give up both nuclear and missile tests, while presenting it as a gesture of good will.
One can recall the repeated proposals put forward by Russian scientists, including Alexander Zhebin, that put forward the idea of separating the North Korean nuclear program from its missile program. It’s most likely that North Korea will never surrender its nuclear devices as they are now mentioned in its constitution, but Pyongyang may be willing to freeze its missile programs, while guaranteeing non-proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies that it has already developed.
You can try to revive the idea of direct negotiations via various hotlines or communication channels that would allow states to solve challenges of a humanitarian nature, like the one that cost Otto Warmbier his life. Finally, North Korea can agree to decrease the level of its anti-American rhetoric.
However, one shouldn’t forget that “tango is a dance for two”, so one can’t help but wonder what kind of concessions Washington can actually make. For most Americans listening to anti-Korean propaganda for years, the very fact negotiations are even happening seems to be a concession, but, theoretically, should also include some things Americans can also sacrifice without losing face. It is possible to reduce the scale of joint exercises conducted with South Korea. There could also be a reduction of the level of so-called democratization attempts conducted in the DPRK by reducing the funding enjoyed by all sorts of NGOs. It is possible, while the moratorium is in force, to refrain from similar military demonstrations such as American bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons patrolling the border between the Koreas.
The US can even try to downplay the problem associated with the lack of documents that would formalize the end of the Korean War. Sure, Washington would sign no peace treaty with North Korea but, as it’s been noted by South Korea, the fact that Kim Jong-Un addressed the sitting US President can be regarded as the establishment of diplomatic relations.
If Kim promises to freeze the DPRK’s missile program, he will take a step away from the so-called red line that Washington has repeatedly pointed out. This red line is associated with the likelihood of a North Korean attack on the continental US, which, if brought to zero, can be presented as Trump’s diplomatic victory. But will it satisfy those who, perhaps, were taken by surprise by the announcement that North Korea was prepared to surrender its nuclear arsenal? Perhaps even the minor concessions described above will be perceived by the US public as totally unacceptable. And then, sooner or later, it would become clear that Chung Eui-yong failed to mention that Pyongyang has put forward a condition, not a plea for mercy. It is hard to imagine that Washington will somehow abandon its conviction that the DPRK is a tyrannical regime that needs to be eliminated in the name of world freedom and democracy. Until this moment comes, North Korea’s nuclear weapons are here to stay.
So if one is demanded to present his opinion on the possible Kim-Trump meeting, it would resemble the attitude towards the meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea: the idea itself is good; the theoretical probability of an event is above zero, but even if such a meeting can reduce tensions for a brief moment, one cannot help but doubt the possibility of achieving any long-term result through it.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
