On January 6, 2018, The New York Times published an article citing the latest interviews of the current and former employees of the American intelligence service, which stated that the US intelligence services believed the rapid development of the nuclear and missile program of North Korea to be “one of the most significant failures”.
The newspaper does not specify when and where they announced it, but it stresses that after Donald Trump’s accession to the presidency, the US intelligence agencies told the new administration that Washington would have at least four years before Pyongyang produced a hydrogen bomb. During this period, the USA should have found a way to retard the DPRK nuclear and missile program, but, as we know, it developed much faster.
According to the newspaper, the senior officials of the intelligence agency recognized that they were mistaken in two “key suppositions” about Pyongyang. First, they considered that the DPRK would need the same time period for the hydrogen bomb production as other countries did during the Cold War period, and they underestimated the access of North Korea to the advanced computer modelling and the use of the third countries’ experience.
They also did not fully take into account the fact that the development of the nuclear program was carried out according to the “catch-up” type and with certain external assistance, at least at the level of expert consultations. The topic of the Russian intrusion was evaded. According to expert estimates cited by the newspaper, “representatives of the former Soviet Union (a bunch, not necessarily and not only Russia) almost certainly work with North Korea. However, they are freelance workers. It is known that the Russian government has not supported the DPRK in this matter.
Second, they underestimated Kim Jong-un who had made the country’s armament program “of higher priority” than his father and grandfather. If the seniors of the Kim family considered the nuclear problem as an element of the political bargaining, the new leader of the country made the nuclear program his “Manhattan project.”
The newspaper does not cover Obama’s policy and experts’ statements during his administration. In addition, the fact that seven out of eight North Korean missiles exploded at the start or broke down during the launch in 2016 “may be a consequence of the successful cyber vulnerabilities program approved by the ex-President Obama.” Thus, one of the leading newspapers in the USA unobtrusively confessed that the US government had practiced so much criticized cyberterrorism.
New York Times associates this with the inconsistency of the White House policy on this issue. If we read the entire text instead of retelling the first abstracts like many other commentators, the situation looks like this. Since 2000, the intelligence officers wrote a lot that a nuclear missile that might hit the American cities was likely to appear in the DPRK in 2015. Four years later, this prediction was corrected amid the war in Iran, and the possible North Korean crisis was postponed till 2019.
The alarmism began to subside after 2008, and the author asks himself what influenced the trend change – whether it was the policy of “strategic patience” or the change of power in the Republic of Korea, after which the South Korean intelligence services began to “feed” their colleagues with fables of the imminent collapse of the regime and a total economic collapse. As a result, the American intelligence services succeeded in forecasting the direction and the general terms of the program but repeatedly “missed the critical turns.”
Thus, “the problems that taught the USA a rough lesson” had begun not with Trump; the author repeatedly pointed at these problems – the limited capacities of electronic and satellite intelligence service and the dependence on the sources of information not mentioned there.
At the same time, according to the CIA Director Mike Pompeo, the statements about the American intelligence service failure are wrong. In an interview to CBS channel, he honestly noted, “I am one of those who tell directly about the failures of the intelligence services when we miss something out. This is not the case.”
In general, Pompeo constantly repeats a thesis that the DPRK will have an opportunity to attack the continental territory of the USA in several months, and the country should form a strategy based on this.
He made the loudest statement of this kind on October 20, 2017 at the event of the Foundation for Defence of Democracies stating that the USA should be ready for a missile strike by the DPRK and take decisions and act as if the Koreans already had such an opportunity. “The likelihood of such a development has increased and will continue to grow because of the lack of a global effort to push back Pyongyang…Whether it happens on Tuesday or on Tuesday next month, we are at a time where the president has concluded that we need a global effort to ensure that Kim Jong-un doesn’t have that capacity.” Every time he is reminded that he has made the same forecasts several months ago, he answers “This is true. I hope I will be able to say it in a year…The US government is working hard to ensure that this moment comes as late as possible.” I should note that this statement is rather reasonable – by recognizing the limitations of the CIA’s ability to clarify the real situation, he suggests proceeding from the most pessimistic option.
At the same event, Pompeo frankly admitted that the USA continued the collection of intelligence information on the nuclear program of Pyongyang but this information was “far from perfect.” It should be noted that since Pompeo became the head of the CIA (appointed by Trump on November 18, 2016, finally approved on January 23, 2017), the US took a number of steps to raise its awareness. Thus, Pompeo created a special centre in the US CIA for the maximum efficient counteraction to nuclear and missile threats of the DPRK engaged in gathering information on the condition of the nuclear weapon and long-range missiles. According to Pompeo, the decision has been taken “to mobilize and use all the resources, opportunities, and powers” in order to react to the threat of Pyongyang and the new centre will act in close cooperation with the intelligence community and the American security services.
In addition, the American military officers in the Republic of Korea planned to establish Department 524 on the issues of human intelligence HUMINT in October 2017 to increase capacities for the collection of information about the DPRK. It will work as a part of the 501st intelligence brigade of the Eighth US Army and it will collect information on the nuclear and missile potential of Pyongyang and predict possible sudden changes in the North. Such an approach is related to the fact that the technical intelligence has reached the limit of opportunities. It is assumed that the high-ranking North Korean refugees and foreigners who have private contacts with the North will be the source of information for this department.
As a result, on October 4, 2017, the Deputy Director of the Korean CIA Department Lee Yeon Seok noted that Kim Jong-un was a very well-minded player that did not wish a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. “Kim Jong-un wants the same as all authoritarian leaders: to rule for a long time and die in his own bed,” and his goal is to gain recognition as a nuclear power and reach an agreement on the withdrawal of US troops from the Korean Peninsula.
In fact, Mike Pompeo is more right-wing than his subordinates in this issue. As for the DPRK issue, he belongs to the group of hawks, but the smart ones. During his visit to the Republic of Korea from April 30 to May 2, Mike Pompeo met with the Director of the National Intelligence Service of South Korea Lee Byung-ho and deliberately visited the South Korean Yeonpyeongdo Island, which faced the North Korean artillery attack on November 23, 2010.
In an interview to Washington Free Beacon, an online media of conservative nature, Mike Pompeo called the terrorism and the DPRK the main threats for the USA, though the North created threats that could not be implemented but raised concerns. Therefore, the North is the most serious threat in the short-term.
Speaking in the American Enterprise Institute on January 23, Mike Pompeo noted that Pyongyang expanded its capabilities in testing missiles and nuclear weapon, and suggested that the North Korean leader would not stop after one successful test. According to Pompeo, the next step will be the development of the weapon arsenal in order to provide opportunities to hit the USA. According to the South Korean media, the CIA head also noted that Kim Jong-un aimed to unite the Korean Peninsula under his authority. At the same time, Pompeo expressed doubts that Kim got reliable information from his military leaders.
As for the action plan, South China Morning Post newspaper reported that Mike Pompeo made one very interesting statement on October 20, 2017, “If Kim Jong-un suddenly disappears, I will not tell about it taking into account the history of the CIA.” “Somebody may think that a coincidence has taken place. “You know, there has been an accident.” In addition, the CIA head added, “We are going to become a much more malicious agency.” This statement cannot be called a joke given the fact that the Northerners accused the CIA and the South Korean Intelligence Service of preparing an assassination of Kim Jong-un in May 2017 using «biological weapon».
Let us summarize the result – the US CIA works, and we should not underestimate the US intelligence service capabilities and the level of their analysts. Pompeo’s strategy is rather reasonable. The speculations about a tremendous fiasco of the CIA by the intra-American critics of Trump should be regarded as a sign of the internal political struggle.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
