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USA – North Korea: Failed Attempt at Dialogue?

Konstantin Asmolov, January 22, 2018

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On 13 December 2017, at a Washington forum organized jointly by the Korean foundation and the analytical center of the Atlantic Council, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated, “The U.S. is ready to begin negotiations with the DPRK at any time “when it wants to and we are ready to hold the first meeting without preconditions”. “Let’s just meet. We can talk about the weather, if you want. We can discuss whether it will be a square table or round table meeting. Than we can proceed to the formation of a road map to what we could aspire”, he emphasized. And although the State Secretary immediately expressed an opinion that in reality, the dialogue with North Korea is unlikely to be possible, subjected to Pyongyang’s mandatory rejection of its nuclear program, he suggested Pyongyang to bring up any question to the table.

The statement of Tillerson caused certain stir and was seen as a continuation of a replica of Joseph Yun on December 8. Then, speaking at an event on the New Year organized by the Korean Foundation for International Culture Exchange and the Center of Korean Studies at George Washington University, the U.S. Special Representative for the North Korea Policy noted that even after the launch of Intercontinental ballistic missile “Hwaseong-15”, the United States are ready to engage in dialogue with North Korea, only if it withholds any test of missiles or nuclear weapons for a duration of 60 days. The official statement of the North Korean authorities on cessation of provocative actions will be considered as a signal to start a dialogue.

Meanwhile, before this, numerous statements made by State department representatives including Tillerson could be summarized as follows:

  • Nuclear Crisis on Korean Peninsula is resolved preferably by diplomatic means” as stated by the Secretary of State in an interview with CNN, although Trump has a developed plan of military action, he is not seeking to start a war with the DPRK: the problem will be resolved diplomatically “until the first bomb falls”. We shall note, however, he did not say whose bomb will exactly fall.
  • ​ Nevertheless, this does not preclude the consideration of other options, including military. As U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated after the sixth nuclear test, “We are not striving for the total annihilation of any country, including the DPRK. But like I said, we have a lot of options to do so.” The DPRK must understand how high the stakes are. Last time, the head of the Pentagon addressed with this thesis on December 29, 2017 and in this respect, the opinions of the heads of the military and diplomatic departments are rather identical.
  • It is declared that the policy regarding the DPRK, United States adheres to the principle of “4 nos”- aspiration in the collapse of North Korea, reunification of Korea by absorption of the North, change of power and invasion. In July 2017, the CIA Director Mike Pompeo stated, “I am confident that the residents of North Korea are wonderful people who would like the dictator to leave.”
  • ​The coexistence of the United States and the nuclear DPRK is impossible – the North Korean threat is unacceptable to the world. In general, Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula is positioned not as an issue between the DPRK and the United States, but as a matter of world importance. However, the thesis that the acceptance of the claims of DPRK means the collapse of the TNW regime or the credibility of the United Nations is rather NOT mentioned.
  • Termination of joint military exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States, and North Korean nuclear provocations is not equivalent solution. Washington has repeatedly voiced its position that joint military exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States have been held for many years, solely for defensive purposes and cannot be compared with Pyongyang’s illegal missile and nuclear programs.
  • The pressure on Pyongyang will continue as long as the North Korean authorities agree to start negotiations that meant not much as an achievement of mutually acceptable consensus than as a definitive pressure until surrender. In fact, this was Trump’s bargaining style when he was a businessman. Precisely for this reason, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley once stressed, “Washington will not implore Pyongyang to return to the round table.”
  • Moreover, previous attempts to solve the problem are positioned as “for the last 25 years, the DPRK succeed in outmaneuvering USA”, although the hypocrisy of this thesis was consistently parsed by the author in a series of materials.
  • The assumption is that “Pyongyang is not seeking a peaceful resolution to the current tensions”. The allegations about its security are unsubstantiated, while seemingly constructive suggestions are insincere or comprise hidden agenda – for instance, premeditation to split the international community.
  • Therefore, there is no need to waste time on useless talks- a couple of times, Trump personally advised Tillerson “not to negotiate until the right time.” And in general, “before it happens many things shall happen. They must stop testing and demonstrate a genuine desire to discuss the ban of their nuclear weapons”. How will the “genuineness” of desire be determined?

Also it is should be taken into account that there is no complete unity of opinion in the administration on this issue. Thus, the overall tone of the statements by the CIA director Mike Pompeo and in particular the National Security Adviser Herbert McMaster is usually more rigorous than that of Tillerson; it clearly states that America will go to any extend to curb the North Korean nuclear threat. However, Mike Pompeo goes on to state that although “North Korea should be aware of the U.S. readiness to resolve the situation not as in the past” and “the U.S. authorities are ready to take measures to protect American cities against nuclear threat”. The issues need to be resolved through diplomatic means.

It is necessary to underline that though rumors have been circulating for a few months about replacing Rex Tillerson by Mike Pompeo or Nicky Haley, Susan Thornton, known for maintaining a relatively moderate position regarding the DPRK and China has been appointed Assistant State Secretary for East Asia and Pacific affairs.

Donald Trump himself periodically states that theoretically he is ready to negotiate with Kim Jong-un and the last statement of this kind was made on January 7, 2018. Nonetheless, “it is too early”, but negotiations should be “under certain conditions”. And for the most part, the dialogue of the leaders takes place in absentia in the form of a “Presidential rap-battle”.

Coming back to the proposal of December 13, firstly, Tillerson put one prerequisite forward – that is to forthwith desist from any missile launches, or more precisely “cessation of North Korean provocation for a certain period of time”. Although he did not mention the exact duration, Washington’s political circle called for a period of 60 days at least. So, in that respect, there were talks about the old trend- “You declare a moratorium and then we will consider doing something in return.” Whether they will do or not is the question, as we are well aware that the previous 75-day moratorium on missile launch challenged quite some specified actions on the part of the United States, among which there were no demonstrative steps towards opponent.

Secondly, to sit down by the table for negotiations and talk about the weather- this is of course an important first step. But, the problem is that it should be followed by a second one and here the question arises- whether the Americans and the North Koreans are able to converge at any point further rather than evaluating the weather and the form of the table for negotiations. More precisely, can Washington offer something that on one part wouldn’t look like a handout and on the other; the internal spiteful foes not accusing it for making “a deal with the devil and betraying the national interests.”

And of course Pyongyang also is not inclined to talk in particular. As the Ambassador of the DPRK to the United Nations in Geneva, Han Tae-Song emphasized in an interview with Reuters on November 17- “As long as joint South Korean- U.S. military exercises continue, dialogues between the DPRK and the United States will be absolutely impracticable: first terminate all exercises and then we can initiate negotiations. Simultaneously, Han Tae-Song also pointed out to the unreal proposition by China on dual freeze; nuclear weapons are a major deterrent against the U.S. threat.

Similar statements were made subsequently and the demands were toughened – nuclear weapon is not a subject of bargaining and the DPRK will start negotiations with the United States subjected to the recognition of its nuclear status.

Thirdly, at the same Atlantic Forum, Tillerson said a number of interesting thing, such as the US and China discussing a program of action in case of riots in North Korea, and this partly indicates us how North Korea in the minds of State Department differs from real, where the probability of “color revolution”, to put it mildly, is utterly low.

In Seoul, they were satisfied with the statement of Tillerson and the representative of the Ministry of unification of the Republic of Korea Baik Tae Hyun immediately voiced a hope that a dialogue, if started will be successful. The dialogue could be initiated in an informal manner and then preceded to a substantive discussion on concrete topics. However, immediately after the statements of Tillerson, White House Press Secretary Sara Sanders stressed that the views of the U.S. President on Pyongyang have not changed and the actions of the DPRK “are bad for everyone and especially for country itself at the most.” In a similar vein, a representative of the U.S. State Department Heather Nauert said, “Washington has no intentions to set any time limit for consultations with the DPRK to start and there won’t be any, but “the time has not come yet”, plus U.S. does not see Pyongyang’s interest in beginning negotiations.”

On December 13, U.S. National Security Council spokesman Michael Anton also said that now was not the time to start negotiations with Pyongyang and “without radically improvement in Pyongyang’s behavior” there will not be any dialogue.

And on December 15, speaking at the ministerial meeting of the UN Security Council in New York, Rex Tillerson said that the renewal of dialogue with North Korea should be preceded by the cessation of the threatening behavior of Pyongyang and the campaign to maintain pressure on the DPRK should and will continue until denuclearization is not achieved.

Simultaneously another potential attempt for a dialogue ended fruitless. It was expected that in mid-December, the U.S. Special envoy Joseph Yun and the officials of the DPRK Foreign Ministry (including the deputy Head of the Institute for Peace and Disarmament Choi Jin) would participate in the international meeting on security in Thailand within the framework of the meetings of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. Nonetheless, the meeting was not held, on the contrary, as reported by the local newspaper “The Nation”, the United States called for Thailand, which was one of the four largest trading partners of the DPRK, to intensify foreign pressure on North Korea.

And on December 18, the U.S. President introduced a new strategy for national security. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (like Iran) was named a “Hostile regime” that spends millions of dollars on the creation of nuclear and biochemical weapons, posing a threat to the USA, while the North Korean people are suffering from starvation. The USA will confront the North Korean threat by superior forces, increasing efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue with no other options.

In response, on December 19, “Rodong Sinmun” published an article where Washington is proposed “peacefully coexistence” with the nuclear DPRK. Pyongyang explained the need for its nuclear arms to defend its sovereignty, the survival of its people and “international justice”.

Considering the response of the U.S. State Department to the Inter-Korean tensions in January, 2018, the last statement of Tillerson in which he commented on the possibility of the renewing dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang against the backdrop of tension between North Korea and South Korea, was very cautious and consistent. In an interview with CNN, the State Secretary said that it is necessary to look at what the results of Inter-Korean negotiations would be, but as for now it is too early to make any conclusions and expectations. So, the United States maintains its position for need of achieving complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and works in this direction together with the International community. Furthermore, the U.S is expecting a signal from the DPRK side to the effect that North Korea realizes that negotiations shall lead to denuclearization. In case of “continuation of the missile and nuclear provocations”, the United States and the International community will have no choice but take stringent retaliatory measures.

Of course, it can be considered that talks on diplomatic solution is nothing more than an umbrella of future military conflict, but the demonization of Washington is no different from the demonization of Pyongyang. The American Administration is facing a very difficult choice and in the next “U.S.-DPRK” series, we will talk about the attempts of informal dialogue and on the “who, how and why” are opposing the use of military force.

Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”