There have been no clear negative consequences of the launch: Japanese Minister of Defense, Gen Nakatani, stated that no damage from the missile’s fall has been observed and the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) reported that the launch did not pose an immediate threat to the United States.
Nevertheless, the Japanese government sent a protest to Pyongyang regarding the missiles launch and the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting within 24 hours at the initiative of the United States and Japan. The meeting was closed to the public and no official documents have been issued.
South Korean media have, as per tradition, linked North Korea’s “provocation” with the deployment of US anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems in South Korea and noted that in 2016, Pyongyang conducted 13 rounds of ballistic missile tests that involved launching 29 various types of missiles total. Even though the missiles in question are not intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) but short and medium-range missiles, South Korean authorities strive to prove that any missile launched by the North Korea is a violation of UN resolutions and should be followed by sanctions.
However, this situation did not even result in any formal expressions of concern and calls for dialogue. Yes, Japan’s representative to the United Nations, Koro Bessho, did express his indignation at the fact that one of the missiles had fallen within Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone and the United Kingdom’s Deputy Representative, Peter Wilson, said that he would insist on filing a statement condemning Pyongyang’s actions. Yes, South Korea’s, the United States’ and Japan’s representatives to the UN held a press conference where they strongly condemned Pyongyang and demanded to put an end to provocations but where is the opinion of the Security Council itself: the singular opinion that reflects the formal position of the international community?
Although the Korean media are reporting that “no official documents followed because it would take some time to prepare them,” they are also writing that “working out a common position of the UN Security Council regarding North Korea may face certain problems” and that China’s representative to the United Nations stressed the inadmissibility of any factors that can exacerbate tensions on the Korean peninsula.
When speaking about this event, it is worth paying attention to the fact that the United States and Company have a reason to behave the way they are: the number of successful launches of North Korean missiles exceeds failed launches. And although approximately 40% of missiles still explode on takeoff or shortly thereafter, North Korea’s missile program is developing faster than experts’ most cautious assessments predicted. Different types of test are being conducted: on maximum height, then on maximum range. Furthermore, Pyongyang is reaching the point where its launches may be a clear violation of UN resolutions where the ballistic missiles are prohibited. For if a carrier missile launch can still be perceived ambiguously, not as a military test (we have previously mentioned that the key point of a military test is not how the rocket is taking off, but how it’s hitting a target), the launch of an ICBM for military purposes should theoretically cause a tougher coordinated response.
However, the current political situation may mean the expected response never arises. As permanent members of the UN Security Council Committee, Russia and China previously chose to at least formally condemn the launches and were required to maintain the long-standing status quo where only “acceptable” countries can have nuclear weapons. However, after the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, the regional geopolitical set-up may be starting to change. In the face of such changes, China and Russia will begin to move away from their previous position where they were forced to condemn North Korea for the sake of consensus. This is a step that would allow them to enjoy certain benefits in the other direction in return. After all, according to one theory, China joined the anti-Korean sanctions after the fourth nuclear missile provocation because Beijing hoped that, in exchange for expressing solidarity with the USA, Washington would consider its regional interests and refrain from placing the ABM systems aimed at China in South Korea. Alas, this was not the case, and if one party does not consider it necessary to take into account the interests of the other, the other party has the right to do the same.
We’ll watch what will happen then, but it seems impossible to unanimously condemn the North and adopt new international sanctions. Of course, the United States, Japan or South Korea may respond with unilateral sanctions, but this will not oblige the entire “international community” to put more pressure on the North. It seems that Russia and China have no intention to publicly announce the disagreements within the Security Council but behind closed doors the negotiations among the permanent members of the Security Council are very tough.
In this sense, it is pretty interesting how Russia and China’s policies on the North Korean issue may look if the tension is further ramped up. There have already been a number of clear demonstrative gestures made by China showing that its relations with South Korea have cooled, be they the deportation of “human rights activists” or curtailing South Korean soap operas. However, if regional tensions increase (and it is important to note the situation in the South China Sea and Chinese-American rivalry in Southeast Asia as a whole), it looks rather likely that Moscow and Beijing will actively protect their regional interests.
Where does this all lead to? – If you compare the existing world order to a building, you’ll see that in certain areas the columns that support it are gradually being destroyed: the Ukraine crisis, scandals around the US presidential election and the Olympic Games in Rio. All of them are tearing down the world order that we are accustomed to, either with the demonstration of double standards, or by actions that, five years ago, would have been deemed unacceptable. The open rift between the USA and its allies on the one hand, and Russia and China on the other has the potential to be another fallen column and perhaps it would be a good idea to think about why the old building is being destroyed and what will be built on its ruins.
Konstantin Asmolov, Ph.D. in History, Chief Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
