Taliban’s presence in in the ruling elite factually means no room for the US in the future of Afghanistan in post-2014 scenario. However, a ‘Taliban free’ scenario could only have been achieved if the COIN succeeded in the first place. Failure of the COIN, now, implies serious threats to the US’ larger strategic interests not only because it would, most probably, have to leave this region, but also because the possible political ascendance of Taliban would leave minimum room for the US to play its geo-political games in the region extending from South to the Western, and Central Asia, with Afghanistan geographically placed in-between these segments of Asia.
The socio-economic development of Afghanistan has turned out to be more of a problem than a solution in itself for the people of Afghanistan. For instance, Aliceghan—a UN and Australian government’s sponsored programme for rehabilitation of refuges and internally displaced (IDP) persons— was supposed to be a haven for war-torn Afghanistan`s returning refugees and a symbol of resurgence after the ‘dark’ years of the Taliban. However, six years after its implementation, the project has started resembling a ‘ghost town’ rather than a ‘new model’ for the returnee. The town built to the North of Kabul is now a mere picture of abandoned houses and empty streets as most of its residents have been driven out by a lack of running water, electricity and high commuting costs. Many of those people who were supposed to stay here have already left the town and returned to the slums and shelters in the capital city they once fled.
A similar fate awaited some other big projects of the US which were crucial part of the multi-dimensional COIN strategy. For instance, the sorry state of the projects like the much pronounced Kajaki Dam in Helmand province and Tarakhil power plant built near Kabul is a perfect example of the “wishful thinking” the US has been following to clear Afghanistan of Taliban. The actual state of Afghanistan’s infrastructural development was clearly highlighted in a report of the Special Inspector General of Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), which highlights considerable delays and mismanagement in the ongoing projects. Regarding energy sector projects, it mentions, “Our reports have found that the U.S. government’s efforts to execute large-scale energy sector projects in Afghanistan have frequently resulted in cost and schedule over-runs, contractor default, questionable or undefined sustainment methods, and wasted U.S dollars”; and mentioning overall, it also cautions, “the scale of most projects means that these agencies will not achieve the planned contributions to the COIN strategy—–”; and “in some instances, these projects may result in adverse COIN effects because they create an expectations gap among the affected population or lack citizen support.”
One of the major reasons for this absence of the very basic facilities and lethargic pace of the implementation is the corruption level which has been eating into the very vitals of the US’ plan of ‘development.’ On this behalf a report of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan, titled ‘Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends’, of December 2012, presents the factual position by highlighting that corruption is seen by the Afghans themselves as one of the most urgent challenges facing their country; that the delivery of public services remains severely affected by bribery in Afghanistan; and that in 2012 half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service and the total cost of bribes paid to public officials amounted to US$ 3.9 billion which also amounted to an increase of 40 percent between 2009 and 2012.
Another crucial element of the COIN strategy included establishing an Afghan national security system in the form of Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). The underlying purpose of this ‘revolutionary’ step in modern Afghan history, again, was to close an avenue for Taliban’s resurgence after the US withdrawal. However, this project has failed miserably too. Instead of developing an ability to fight Taliban, ANSF is marked by rising rate of casualties, desertion and attrition, sexual abuse, extortion and kidnapping. A CNN report of 2013 went to the extent of claiming that Taliban have successfully infiltrated the ANSF and many of the inside attacks are being precipitated by them; notwithstanding the fact that such inside attacks are themselves strong evidences of the growing anger among people. According to certain other reports of ISAF, 27% of Afghan Army deserted in the year 2012, 16.8% of Afghan Police and 14% of Afghan Air Force. Most of them allegedly join the insurgents along with their weapons and in some cases vehicles too.
One of the most significant consequences of such inefficiency of the US-backed ‘civilian’ government of Afghanistan, and drastic failures of the COIN operations and projects is the people’s growing dissatisfaction with such form of rule, and rapidly growing acceptance of Taliban’s mode of governance. This aspect was clearly highlighted in a 2012 report of Afghanistan based ISAF—State of Taliban—which stated in explicit terms that were the last years were marked by an unprecedented rise of interest in joining the insurgent among the Afghan civilians. The effectiveness of Taliban governance, mentioned in the report, in turn allows for increased recruitment rates which, subsequently, bolsters Taliban’s ability to recover loses they initially suffer in COIN military operations.
The US’ plan of “transition” in Afghanistan lacks the crucial requirement of planning i.e. a clear definition of the mission, and the US’ vague definition of transition, too, does not provide any specific goals for the above mentioned and other such projects supposedly promoting development, democracy, and human rights. In fact, the US does not seem to have any real intentions of paving the way for real peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan; for, peace would jeopardize its own interests in Afghanistan and leave no room for manipulations. The evidence for this assumption may be found in the speech of the US President of May 1, 2012 in which he called neither for the defeat of Taliban nor for the total elimination of any “form of terrorist presence” in Afghanistan; rather, the US’ course of action was left to be decided by “course of events.”
Guided by this basic objective, the US is, therefore, bent upon using all available means to maintain military presence in the name of keeping peace. In reality, this force is to be left with the purpose of retaining a politico-strategic stranglehold in Afghanistan and respond to any threat to the “vital” interests of the US by any actor—state or non-state.
In this context, the US sponsored projects of ‘development’, like those mentioned above, are meant basically to cover the true purposes of the US which include not only creating a condition characterized by “controlled instability” and triggering low-intensity conflict among Afghan themselves, which would thereby provide a vague justification for the US forces to stay in Afghanistan for a longer period—irrespective of the human and material cost it may involve. In other words, the reality of the actual objectives of the US explains the myth of all plans talks of establishing peace and ‘unleashing’ forces of development.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research-analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
