The 3-day visit of the Indian foreign minister, S.M Krishna, to Islamabad for the 2nd round of the dialogue process (begun in 2010 – two years after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 and the subsequent sharp deterioration in relations) was extremely important for Pakistan. On September 8, 2012 the two parties signed an agreement on visa liberalization, a memorandum of mutual understanding on cultural exchange, and a supplement to the Agreement on confidence-building measures in areas such as the Line of Control (LOC), trade and travel.
In January 2013, following the first armed clashes on the border with Kashmir, the Pakistani foreign minister, at the insistence of his generals, approached the UN with an initiative to conduct an independent investigation into incidents on the Pakistan-India border with Kashmir, inviting experts from the United Nations Military Observers Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to participate. The initiative, however, was not sustained.
During the past year Islamabad and New Delhi have each accused the other of violating the 2003 ceasefire along the Line of Control. Pakistani media has reported 16 border incidents in five different sectors of the LOC, unprovoked gun shots, etc. Escalating tensions have adversely affected the peaceful dialogue as a whole between the two parties. Questions have been raised about the preferential granting of visas to certain groups of citizens, about cultural exchanges, the trade liberalization process, etc. Despite numerous assurances and commitments to the International Monetary Fund, Islamabad did not provide New Delhi with “Most Favoured Nation” (MFN) status during 2013.
During an exacerbation of relations in the spring of 2013, Beijing expressed willingness to act as arbitrator in the Kashmir controversy. The proposal was gratefully received, but postponed.
In recent years Islamabad has been deeply interested in the normalization of relations with India, initiating official and private meetings between key leaders, taking advantage of every opportunity for negotiations during various international forums, etc. In 2013, however, the dragging out of the settlement process over several months was also explained by factors of a subjective nature: the changing of political leadership and a reshuffling in the ranks of Pakistan’s generals.
In May of 2013 Nawaz Sharif assumed the post of Prime Minister for the 3rd time (his first 2 terms being 1990 – April 1993, 1997 – October 1999) following parliamentary elections. The new head of the federal cabinet of ministers again, as in past years, declared a normalization of relations with India. Diplomatic contacts took on a particularly official nature (recall that in response to India’s nuclear tests in the spring of 1998, tests by Pakistani nuclear installations were carried out under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in May of that year; in the summer of 1999 an armed conflict broke out on the Kargili border and relations between the countries’ leaders sharply deteriorated).
In 2013 Nawaz Sharif again positioned himself as an ambassador of peace to India. Indeed, subjective factors – such as border and trade issues – demanded immediate resolution. During the summer and fall diplomatic traffic intensified between the two capitals.
In mid-December 2013 New Delhi paid a private visit to Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Pakistan’s largest province, Punjab (bordering the Indian state of Punjab) and older brother to the head of the federal cabinet of ministers, Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. Heading the day’s agenda was the strengthening of business ties (visits were paid to several coal and solar energy power generation plants, a number of agricultural facilities, etc.). The main purpose of the visit to Nawaz Sharif’s clansman, however, proved to be the holding of an informal meeting with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. In response to his statements on cross-border skirmishes, Shahbaz Sharif hastened to assure him that Pakistan is prepared to clear up all uncertainty on the issue, and that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has proposed that New Delhi carry out an independent, 3rd-party investigation into incidents along the Line of Control. The parties agreed that, firstly, the leadership of the two countries have no other choice than to pursue a peaceful course; and, secondly, on the necessity of resolving a series of contentious issues: water supply, Kashmir, the Siachen and Sir Creek conflicts, etc.
Nawaz Sharif’s diplomacy, however, proved largely ineffective. New Delhi insisted that border incidents along the Line of Control be attended to before any other action be taken. Military leaders also took part in the negotiations, but only at the end of 2013 (December 24) did a meeting take place between the chiefs of military operations of the Pakistani and Indian Armies. The parties reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining the ceasefire along the Line of Control; agreed to establish a hotline, and to focus on making it more effective and results-oriented; agreed to inform each other in the case of civilians unintentionally crossing the Line of Control, with a view to their speedy return and reaffirmed a zero-tolerance policy on smuggling, illegal erection and dismantling of border posts, etc.
The 2013 events along the Line of Control effectively reversed the diplomatic successes of previous years, and in December 2013 the parties again set at the negotiation table to start the writing of a new political agenda with a clean slate. A situation similar to that of 1947 is being repeated, following the well-known formula, “One step forward, two steps back.”
A topic of discussion for many political analysts is the deterioration of Pakistan and India’s competing strategic interests in the region, which will only intensify over the course of time (rivalry in the India/China region, the strengthening of India’s position with Pakistan in neighbouring Afghanistan and Iran, etc.).
In January 2014 Indian media was again replete with reports of violations along the Line of Control. The press service of the Pakistani Army, along with the Department of Foreign Affairs, refuted these claims, emphasizing their provocative nature. These statements were released against the background of negotiations between the trade ministers of both countries during the 5th Conclave of SAARC business leaders in New Delhi, held from January 16-18, 2014.
Proceeding on this information, we may expect that 2014 will present new challenges to Pakistan-India relations, and that the parties will again be faced with the necessity of developing a formula for peaceful coexistence.
Natalia Zamaraeva, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow for the Pakistan Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”.
