Source: LJ
The recent events in North Korea and, in the first place, the arrest of Jang Sung-taek (who was married to Kim Jong-un’s paternal aunt), as well as a series of other public executions have given rise to a number of questions regarding how this “tightening of screws” can be congruent with the set of measures to liberalise the economy and create joint economic zones.
Professional enemies of the DPRK already predict it “another Chinese cultural revolution” explaining that in order to consolidate his own personal authority Kim Jong-un uses Jang Sung-taek as a scapegoat and blames him for all the failures of the past. And also, the Pyongyang regime will once again start explaining the internal difficulties by external manipulation and, therefore, will definitely undertake new provocations.
In the author’s view, North Korea is really starting a cleansing. And this cleansing is connected to the young leader’s new course, which consists not only of the parallel development of military and economic construction, but also of certain legalisation of what is widely referred to as “parallel economy”.
The scale of this phenomenon is quite well known, and that is not only thanks to information from defectors. So for the sake of the analysis of the situation, it is necessary to bear in mind that the parallel economy has existed for a long time, and formally it is not connected to the state but constitutes quite a significant force in terms of its overall influence and networks of corrupt links.
Russian orientalist and Korea expert A. Lankov has once compared the DPRK to Central Asia at the end of the Brezhnev era, with quite a Soviet-type exterior and a traditional interior consisting of both corruption and private businesses which were presented as state-owned. It is not clear to what extent such a comparison is justified, but it should be borne in mind that the statements that North Korea is the “last island of the socialist spirit” and an ideally operating administrative-command system are as far from the reality as its perception as an exemplary Empire of Evil.
The North Koreans expressed these types of complaints even in the Kim Il-sung period approximately starting in the early 1980s. And as for the high level of corruption in the 1990s, Kim Jong-il pointed out to it himself and cited quite specific examples. Here is, for example, what happened at a metallurgical plant in Hwanghae: “a group of miscreants plotting with local authorities and state security bodies” started cutting into pieces equipment at the plant, which had stopped operating due to the general problems in the country, and selling it on as scrap metal to China. In order to unmask the corruption offenders, the army troops were brought in and the plant premises were surrounded. I am not sure that during the 15 years that have passed since then the sprawl of the parallel economy has not been accompanied by the sprawl of corruption.
The second thing that we should not forget about is that, since the young general got into power, the Centre’s control over what is happening in the country has decreased. It is partly explained by the fact that it is not easy for the young leader to gain, within a short period of time, the amount of administrative experience that his late father had. Neither is it clear whether the young leader has a team of his own. It is also possible that, from the psychological point of view, such a young leader is perceived in the country of Confucius as something not quite natural.
What can a country get from a combination of these factors provided that power does not radically resist to the emerging trend? The answer is: many unpleasant things, and, in predicting various versions of the DPRK’s future, the author gave third or fourth place to “bananisation”, during which North Korea turns into an outcast and starts matching the stigma around it as a threat to global or regional stability.
The most likely scenario for this process is as follows. A special feature of the parallel economy is that its dependence on the state is minimal and it undermines loyalty to it: from the ideological point of view, the state should be suppressing it, but for market reasons it has to ignore it not to let the population die from starvation. The people who are seriously involved in this process are, of course, infected with doublethink, and they refrain from actively opposing themselves to power either because of strong control from the top or because of the understanding that changing the status quo would make things worse for them.
However, the weakening of control is fraught not only with the fact that the Centre is unable to reign in regional authorities, but also with the fact that the feedback system gets disrupted, and the Centre might not be aware of many actions at the grassroots level since the system of informal corrupt links starts to prevail over the formal/official system. In such a situation, the regional or sectoral bosses of the second tier could start getting brazen and use the state only as a source of personal prosperity. Greed prevails over patriotism, and although it has not come to betrayal yet choosing personal benefit to the detriment of the abstract interests of the country is becoming a norm.
The situation is exacerbated by the remaining theoretical possibility of another food crisis, especially as it is unlikely that there will be a lot of assistance. If we assume that for some reason Pyongyang is not offered sufficient assistance, the leadership will have to make a choice about what should be done. One of the options is to try and do the same thing as 15 years ago, that is, to adopt a regime of austerity, to provide food for the army, children and large cities, and to turn a blind eye to the rest of the population as there is no possibility to help them, and let them survive as they can. The problem is that this will be perceived by the population as “we have been abandoned by the state again” so loyalty to this state will hit rock bottom. This, in turn, will significantly enhance the chances for a change of regime for internal or external reasons.
In this case scenario as well, the corruption schemes will get event stronger because entrepreneurial activities will still be illegal, but the pressure will create a fertile climate for abuse, which will involve also those who are supposed to be fighting against these types of social evil. This will create that scale of the sprawl of structures independent of the state where the state cannot any longer do anything about it. Attempts to tighten the screws will encounter sabotage and the understanding that the thread on these screws has been long worn off.
The second type of solution is, in fact, similar to the first one, but it has a slightly different packaging – while implementing “market reforms”, the state recognises the existence of the parallel economy and decriminalises it to a certain extent. However, people with the mentality of “new Koreans” will be still there, and, in the new situation, there will be more opportunities for them to influence the state and use it as a feeder, so they will gradually turn from unofficial elite into official one.
In doing so, they might not need to replace the young Kim. Suffice it to have a situation where he, surrounded by his father’s entourage, will play a ceremonial role, enjoy the external attributes of a leader or believe that the main thing is the improvement of living standards and everything else is not that important.
As a result, in a few years’ time, we can really get a situation where the DPRK will resemble its propaganda-leaflet image much more than it does today. Partitocracy will be engaged in personal enrichment doing a lot for the sake of short-term gain and 300% profit. This profit will mean much more to them than the long-term unpleasant consequences or damage to the reputation of the country (the drug barons of Mexico and Colombia are not particularly bothered about the image of their homeland as a result of their actions). In this situation, the state will be incapable to solve this problem in principle, although, probably, there will be those who will be caught and demonstratively executed – they will be either those who simply get caught in the “campaign” or those who do not want to share generously. But this will not change the overall situation despite the fact that the central leadership will be still responsible for arbitrariness at the grassroots level, although totalitarianism has been long gone. When it is possible to hand over money for not being present at a party meeting, it is not totalitarianism at all.
How is the Centre going to respond to this process? Of course, the young leader will try to solve this problem. But until the young general builds his own team, he will not be able to conduct large-scale cleansing. Firstly, you need to have people who could replace the current officials – considering the fact that human material has changed and, during the songun period, the difference between the military and the civilians in terms of their attitude to material benefits almost disappeared. Secondly, the repressions can be large-scale, so they (even if conducted under the sign of fighting against corruption) will not contribute to internal stability and improvement of the external reputation of the regime. Hence, let us assume that, whilst understanding the need for cleansing, they still will not resort to it – and that will be perceived as encouragement or permissiveness: as theft is no longer punished, that means it is allowed. Or we can expect something similar to the fight against corruption in the RK, when the fight is under way but corruption remains.
Meanwhile, bananisation can be combined with the enhancement of formal nationalist ideology and weaving between the neighbouring superpowers, although it will be not so much a play on contradictions but ripping the allies off one by one and occasionally retreating from one’s own positions in exchange for assistance and investments. In this case, in fact, the North Korean leadership can go down the same route as Gaddafi, who turned into a “nobody’s friend” but started observing the rules of a good dictator in exchange for economic assistance and certain non-interference in internal affairs. At least until the first serious crisis, which all of the neighbouring countries will try to prevent from happening. Hence, the North can become an unpleasant boil that will be showered with money so that it does not burst.
At the same time, the country will remain a problem both for China and the RK and will finally adopt the model of feeding on what has been left over from the past and scrounging for assistance in exchange for blackmail and in the hope that the contradictions between the USA and China will not allow these two countries to jointly punish the north-Korean regime. In this version, even the unification of Korea will bring about more problems, since the collapse will continue and the mentality difference between the northerners and the southerners will exacerbate significantly.
Obviously, such murky prospects are visible not only to the author, but also to the decision makers in Pyongyang, especially taking into consideration the fact that a number of incidents concerning, for example, the company Shining Group or the cases where attempts were made to take Chinese fishermen hostage can well be interpreted as the indication that some provincial leaders already feel as if they were appanage princes who are allowed lots of things.
In the meantime, corruption offenders constitute a threat to the authoritarian regime merely because their prosperity is not directly linked to its survival. And in exchange for the promises that the new government will not touch their profits, they might well play the role of the fifth column.
And again, to legalise the parallel economy and give ordinary citizens a chance to earn money is one thing, but to legalise the corrupt structures which have been profiting from the illegitimacy of this aspect of economic activity is a totally different thing. Their existence in the new circumstances will not contribute to the broad majority’s loyalty to the regime.
But what should be done if corruption has really become widespread and it is quite happy with the status quo? Here, indeed, the conclusion can be made that the situation will be saved only through massive and rigorous repressions, right through to making an official announcement that, from now on, establishing a corrupt group is equated to establishing an anti-party clique (should be read as: with malicious intent personally against the leader) and will be punished accordingly, regardless of who was in charge of that system. Singapore’s leader Lee Kuan Yew has presumably said the following: “If you want to start seriously fighting against corruption, get three of your friends jailed. You know what it is for, and they know what it is for.”
The arrest of Jang Sung-taek should be also perceived from this angle as well as the recent executions, which were actually associated with a funny propaganda trick. In the original, the talk was of a group of people who had been engaged in the smuggling and illegal copying of South Korean video products. Now it does not really matter which exactly video products they were (although one of the South Korean types of series was the so-called Anti-Communist Drama). However, our press did not mention that, and, from the long list of accusations, it only reported that 80 people had been executed “for watching South Korean series”. It would be an example of similar selective delivery of information if it was reported that the Stalin regime had executed minister of water transport Nikolai Yezhov (without mentioning his activity – as head of the secret police from 1936 to 1938, during the most severe period of Stalin’s Great Purge – before being appointed to this post) for his belonging to sexual minorities.
Moreover, it can be expected that a chain of anti-corruption activities can start in the country indeed, and they will be presented as the fight against factionists and demoralisers. The world’s media might quite misinterpret this fight presenting it as the misconceived conception that the new leader, just like a new head of the Empire of Evil should do, is consolidating the personal power regime at the expense of the demonstrative execution of all those who disagree and those selected for the role of “scapegoats”. The question is to what extent this policy will be successful and to what extent Kim Jong-un will really manage to reverse the trend. There may be many potential opponents to this course, and they are capable to both sabotage the guiding instructions of the leader and to use them for settling scores with other corruption offenders, without solving the problem in principle. The question is whether Kim Jong-un will have sufficient political will and whether he has already built his own team that he can rely on. Time will show that. For the time being, we are in a position to say that the new leader is acting quite decisively, and his ruling style is already different from that of Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il.
There may be an interesting time in store for North Korea, and the transformation of the system might go faster than it seems. We only need to remember that the above version of the country’s slipping into serious problems is among the most unpleasant ones for Russia. Let us wish to Pyongyang every success in implementing the reforms with clean, corruption-free hands.
Konstantin Asmolov, Cand. Sc. (History), is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Far Eastern Studies, exclusively for “New Eastern Outlook”.
