As recently reported by RT and various media outlets, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan proposed signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan based on the points already agreed upon, leaving unresolved issues for future discussions.
Pashinyan’s suggestion was that Yerevan and Baku sign a text including only the points around which there is already a mutual agreement. But that’s not how treaties tend to work. Negotiations continue until there is full agreement. “Nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon” is how it is often described.
There are more layers of confusion in recent official press releases, and the title speaks for itself, “There is no peace treaty in the world that answers all possible questions”. The Prime Minister refers to the possibility of signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan.
He adds: “According to the statements made by Azerbaijan, 80 percent of the treaty has been agreed upon.”
“We say, let’s sign what is agreed and move on to the rest, issues that have not been agreed upon so far. But there is a view that, no, unless everything is agreed or all the articles are agreed, that treaty should not be signed. And I’m sorry, how many articles should it have?”
The proposed peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as discussed by Nikol Pashinyan, highlights several key points, but he is too quickly jumping the gun:
Although Pashinyan emphasizes that 80% of the peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been agreed upon. However, considering the history between the two countries, what good would it do to sign agreed parts and then to continue discussions in “good faith” on other sections, suggesting that signing would improve the environment for further negotiations?
It is as if this approach would represent something of a pragmatic approach, where incremental progress was prized in part over a final consensus; however, I would beg to differ.
Too much ambiguity
One would only have to look at the Paris Peace Accord, and Treaty of Versailles in the wake of WW1 and what that led the world into down the road, in retrospect. Within diplomacy or in the world of business it is necessary to work out the details, to agree on every single article, work out the details, before signing, and be able to back up with might what is on paper, i.e., an enforcement mechanism by outside powers.
However, does Pashinyan think that political good intentions will be enough to overcome differences and to suggest that the number of articles in the treaty could be flexible?
He should study history, this was the case with the “League of Nations”, created with the best of intentions to maintain peace, but lacked any real enforcement power, especially without the U.S. joining. When violations after the ink was barely dried (e.g., Germany rearming), the League was unable to prevent further aggression or enforce the terms of the treaty.
And we know what happened next!
All the while, the Armenian PM refutes Azerbaijan’s assertions that Armenia’s Constitution contains territorial claims against Azerbaijan, explaining how Armenia’s Constitution diverges from its Declaration of Independence. Conversely, he points out that Azerbaijan’s Constitution indirectly makes territorial claims against Armenia. However, Pashinyan believes this issue is resolved by a clause in the treaty that prevents domestic law from being used as an excuse for not fulfilling treaty obligations.
The Prime Minister insists that Armenia is prepared to open regional transport routes through its territory, but only under terms that safeguard its sovereignty and jurisdiction, aligned with international norms. He acknowledges Azerbaijan’s alternative plan to route transport through Iran, yet affirms Armenia’s willingness to offer similar terms.
Ploy or naïve good intentions?
The rhetoric here feels like doublespeak—who’s really calling the shots? Pashinyan’s proposal sounds like a political maneuver, but Aliyev’s statements also seem equally questionable.
What Pashinyan said seems like a ploy to me. What Aliyev says likewise—the leaders say things, and then they do different things. There is no basis of trust between them. In the past, that issue was addressed through intermediaries: Either Russia alone or other partners would serve both as mediators of negotiation as well as, in principle, guarantors of the outcome. Russia lost some of its standing in that regard—at least that is how outsiders want to portray what is going on in the region—at least what they would like to have us believe.
Nonetheless, The United States is much too distant. France or Iran seems too pro-Armenian. Turkey is allied with Azerbaijan. The EU or Germany could be options. But nobody has boots on the ground, and thus no enforcement mechanisms are in place.
Any deal without the possible use of force to back it up is just a paper exercise—and naïve at best. But it is worth mentioning, however, the observers from the EU are indeed on the ground at the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. But they do not have any firepower, of course.
Enduring peace or simmering conflict?
There are no good reasons to be optimistic about an enduring peace. Even if Yerevan and Baku signed an agreement, they would have to trust each other to see it through. The demarcation along Armenia’s north-east and Azerbaijan’s north-west is a positive sign that way.
But can it last?
What will happen when there is a change of power in Yerevan? Or Moscow or Ankara … and what if the leadership in Baku is tempted to renege on its commitments, as it has been doing along Armenia’s borders since the spring of 2021?
Nikol Pashinyan’s proposed peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be taken with more than a healthy degree of skepticism, considering it more likely a self-serving act of political desperation. The very suggestion of signing a treaty-based only on agreed points will be perceived as a sign of weakness.
Considering the historical record, any comprehensive agreements between Azerbaijan and Armenia, at least one that would ensure lasting peace, should be well-conceived. It is necessary to highlight in the final analysis the lack of trust between the two nations and doubts about whether a partial treaty could accomplish anything real and lasting.
Just look at historical parallels, rushing into an agreement without fully addressing all issues could result in future instability. Nothing is worth rushing into, notwithstanding all that is going on in the world and taking a “wait-and-see” approach, and this may be the best option for all sides, as the likelihood of enduring peace without robust enforcement mechanisms, being well armed, and having external security guarantees in place. Aside from usual sources, it is worth-mentioning, that Armenia has been purchasing arms from India as well.
Otherwise, not having the firepower to back up any agreement, the paperwork is but a lame exercise in good intentions, and not to forget the proverbial road, and thus potentially fatal.
Henry Kamens, columnist, expert on Central Asia and Caucasus, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook”
