The Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack. A spokesman for the group, Shahidullah Shahid, said afterward, “This is a reminder to the Pakistani government that we are still alive, and here you have our answer to the killing of innocent people in drone strikes. This is revenge for the murder of Hakimullah Mehsud. The attack was planned earlier, but it was carried out as the government was negotiating with the Pakistani Taliban.”
Not a single Pakistani government agency took accountability for the airport incident. The Interior Ministry had no comment for 36 hours.
Since winning parliamentary elections in May 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has made battling terrorism and extremism a cornerstone of his domestic policy, along with solving the energy crisis and improving the economy. In marked contrast to his predecessors in the Pakistan People Party, the ruling party from 2008 to 2013, the new prime minister has held firm on a course of negotiation with the Pakistani Taliban. He dissuaded the political opposition and the military brass from launching an incursion into North Waziristan, which he believed would complicate the situation and nullify the government’s attempts at dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban. He also found the right words to appease the Americans, and the United States halted drone attacks on the militants’ hideouts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the border with Afghanistan. Lastly, he assembled a team of government negotiators.
Talks started in February 2014. Both sides agreed to a cease-fire during the 40-day dialogue period. That was the only major success. In April, the terrorism began anew in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the provinces of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan and the port of Karachi. On 20-21 May, the army staged an offensive in North Waziristan. The air force unleashed strikes on the insurgents’ hideouts in the region, and armed clashes took place in various parts of the tribal areas.
In response to the military action in North Waziristan, the militants set off a pair of explosions in Islamabad on 24 April and warned that the government could expect even fiercer attacks in the future.
Blasts in Taftan and Dera Bugti followed. Killings and kidnappings became routine in the tribal areas.
Sharif’s pursuit of dialogue with the Pakistani Taliban was to some degree tied to his ability to cement authority over the country as well as the restive region. The negotiations were doomed from the start, though, because of the preconditions set by the Taliban. They demanded that Pakistan impose Sharia law and make the Constitution null and void. The government negotiators rejected the demands even though they represented a co-religionist party. There appear to have been several missteps along the way. For too long, Sharif’s authority was shoved off to the side, and he underestimated the present capabilities of the insurgents. He didn’t listen to the top military commanders when they said an all-out assault on the militants in the tribal areas was imperative. And finally, Sharif’s ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League N, utterly failed at implementing the national policy for domestic security.
On 6 June, a few days before the terrorist attack, Pakistan’s Senate approved anti-terrorism legislation and amended the 1997 Anti-terrorism Act for the second time. The legislation gave the government wider latitude to act against individuals and organizations that finance terrorism. It authorized the authorities to freeze bank accounts, make arrests and confiscate assets. Sharif insisted that the law broaden the powers of the Interior Ministry, taking into account the complicated relationship between the ministry and the military high command. Pundits remarked that the bill is toothless, and that called to mind the sharp disagreements during the discussion of it in 2013 and 2014. But prior to the hearings this month, the government informed senators that if the bill weren’t passed by the end of June, Pakistan would face international financial sanctions.
The Karachi airport terrorist attack has brought a number of issues to the forefront. Many in Pakistan believe that it has destroyed the prospects for peaceful discussions between the Pakistani Taliban and the government. However, a few days afterward, Maulana Samuil Haq, the leader of his own faction of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam and a member of the government’s negotiating team, announced that dialogue is the only way to bring back peace, since the country is now on a war footing.
Opposition senators are urging the Cabinet to sack the interior minister and get full-scale military operations underway posthaste to battle militants in North and South Waziristan and certain parts of Punjab province.
Law enforcement agencies and the military brass have agreed that there must be better intelligence sharing between the central government and the provinces in the anti-terrorism fight. Sharif has pledged resources to intelligence agencies to track terrorists’ movements.
The month of June is proving to be quite a test of Sharif’s mettle and that of his ruling Muslim League N, which has been in power for a full year now. If they do not fail the test, they will receive a mark of satisfactory. It is not so much the granting of additional powers and resources that is going to be crucial for this administration. Instead, the important things are going to be reacting to the challenges of the day with an adequate and effective response, avoiding the pitfalls of getting locked into the party heartland in Punjab, acknowledging the successes of previous administrations, and following constitutional protocol to put relations with the military high command back on track.
Natalia Zamarayeva is a doctoral candidate in history, senior area expert on Pakistan for the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a special contributor to “New Eastern Outlook”.
