Since the last Chronicle of the Taiwan Issue, a lot has happened both in terms of specific events and – far more – in verbal and informational space. The main focus of the world media was, of course, on the preparatory process, the course as well as the outcome of the 20th CPC National Congress as a whole and those aspects of it that touched on the Taiwan issue, which may be the most dangerous issue at the current stage of the Great Game.
It should be noted right away that the author does not share the popular opinion that there were any fundamental innovations in the said issue following the Congress. The only tangible result was that all the fundamental positions on which the Chinese leadership’s Taiwan policy has been based for decades were copied and pasted into the founding documents of China’s ruling party.
For example, the requirement for external partners to comply with the One China Principle formulated back in 1992 in the so-called Consensus. A law enacted in 2005 gives Beijing the option of using military force to resolve the Taiwan issue. The preference for a peaceful way of “restoring the unity of the nation” has remained unchanged (and even became stronger).
As for all sorts of post-event predictions about the exact timing of the “attack on Taiwan,” these are based on very general considerations or are even speculative in nature.
In the public policy space in general, recently, an inflated importance has been attached to big words (about “red lines,” “double standards,” “violations of international law”) as well as to some papers adopted by a “unanimous vote.” The latter “vote” is, however, not needed in most cases, such as all sorts of long-term “Strategies” and “Reviews.” These are only suitable for pointing fingers at the other side of the geopolitical barricade: “Well, there you go. The master does not like me now.”
The Taiwan issue will be transformed not by such papers, but by the actual development of the whole complex of relations between the now two leading world powers. The Taiwan issue occupies a prominent place, but does not fill the entire space of US-China relations.
The economic sphere remains their most important component. “Economic coherence” of the US and China is not a figure of (political) speech, but a reality that has been shaped by well-known circumstances since the Cold War. These “circumstances” have disappeared (or even reversed their significance), while “coherence” has stood and continues to grow stronger. This is despite attempts to break it up in the most advanced sectors of the economy, which are destined to fail.
The current reality of US-China relations is essentially due to the impatient treading of the boots of US business captains under the political table: “When will these public loudmouths finally stop putting a spoke in our wheel on the Chinese market? Because of them, the Chinese are buying Airbuses and not our Boeings.”
On the Chinese side, there are no signs of any intention to reverse course on “opening up” its economy and stepping up its own economic expansion abroad, including to the US. There is no reason to attribute any such signs to the fact of a fundamental change in the composition of the CPC’s governing body. Suffice it to quote the same Xi Jinping at the last Congress: “We must fully, clearly and comprehensively implement the new concept of development, adhere firmly to the reformist path of the socialist market economy, and continue at a high level to expand openness to the outside world.”
Just a week after the 20th Congress, an updated version of the “Catalogue” of industries in which foreign capital is simply invited to invest was published. Preparations are underway for the fifth China International Import Expo (CIIE) (November 5-10), the world’s largest import trade fair. Among foreign participants, US companies have consistently held a leading position.
Notable is the view expressed in an interview with Bloomberg by Katherine Tai, the US President’s Trade Representative, that the current US administration has taken a wait-and-see attitude towards Beijing. The senior US official seems to have reason to believe that the scenario of bilateral relations is not predetermined and could be either negative or positive for the US.
Even more notable is the fact and content of the Chinese leader’s address to the participants of the regular meeting of the National Committee on US-China Relations. This committee has been operating in the US since 1966, i.e. when Washington’s new course on China was taking shape, eventually resulting in “ping-pong diplomacy”.
The said address was made four days after the end of the 20th CPC National Congress. A day later Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi hosted US Ambassador Nicholas Burns in Beijing, who is a very important figure in US politics. In the same days, a “renowned climate scientist” John Kerry appeared on the scene of US-China relations.
In the above context, it should be noted that US experts increasingly view that by focusing public attention on the Taiwan issue in various ways (including by activating its military toolkit) China’s government is in fact addressing its own domestic problems.
These views might largely explain the restrained and cautious official US reaction to “Chinese provocations in the Taiwan Strait.” This was especially the case during Nancy Pelosi’s notorious visit to the island. The reaction was along the lines of, “What’s all the fuss about anyway? We reaffirm the One China Principle, and our trips to the island do not violate it.”
For the time being, let this author limit his commentary on the current stage in the evolution of the “US” factor in the Taiwan issue and turn briefly to the “Japanese” one. It has continued to assert its existence on various occasions. In particular, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s funeral was attended by the daughter of former Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui. The latter is also a very significant figure, but in the history of Japan-Taiwan relations. In turn, a delegation of Japanese MPs who were in Taipei for the celebrations of the “Double Ten Day” (the beginning of the “Xinhai Revolution” is associated with the tenth day of the tenth month of 1911) visited the grave of the same Li Teng-hui.
However, all of this can rather be attributed to the political symbolism of Japan’s accelerating delving (perhaps even just a return) into the Taiwan issue. What Tokyo’s actual policy will look like within it should be made clear by the new version of the National Security Strategy, which will appear by the end of this year.
The scenario that Beijing will choose in solving the Taiwan issue will in no small measure depend on domestic political developments on the island. A more or less realistic picture will emerge from the regular local elections scheduled for the end of November. It should be recalled that four years earlier, in a similar election, the now ruling Democratic Progressive Party suffered a heavy defeat, and its leader and current Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen was even forced to step down briefly as DPP leader at the time.
Today (and so far), however, the sociological probe of Taiwanese sentiment does not indicate their willingness to support the Kuomintang, the DPP’s main political rival, again. Incidentally, a greeting was sent on behalf of the Kuomintang to the CPC leadership on the occasion of the 20th National Congress, which drew criticism from the DPP. Meanwhile, opinion polls show that about 80% of Taiwanese oppose adherence to the “One China Principle” and about the same number favor increasing the island’s defense capability.
Finally, one cannot ignore the global context of the games that are unfolding in the US-China system of relations in general and around the Taiwan issue in particular. At its core are Washington’s attempts to prevent the Beijing-Moscow tandem from becoming fully consolidated. Alternately increasing pressure on one member of said tandem while demonstrating “goodwill” with the other is the current strategy to achieve such a goal.
This is something that both Beijing and Moscow need to take into account.
Vladimir Terekhov, expert on the issues of the Asia-Pacific region, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”
