On September 23, for the first time since October 2017, a US Navy carrier strike group led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan arrived in South Korea’s Port of Busan.
The strike group consisted of three ships: USS Ronald Reagan, a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier; USS Chancellorsville, a Ticonderoga-class missile cruiser; and USS Barry, an Arleigh Burke-class Aegis-equipped destroyer.
The Ronald Reagan visit to Busan can be seen as a demonstration of the realization of the “DPRK’s extended deterrence” concept. ROK Minister of Defense Lee Jong-sup and United States Forces Korea (USFK) Commander General Paul LaCamera jointly visited the aircraft carrier the following day. On September 27, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the ROK Armed Forces Kim Seung-kyum visited the aircraft carrier.
On September 26-29, the ROK and US navies conducted joint exercise in the Sea of Japan for the first time since 2017. More than 20 ships were involved. The exercise program included Special Operations Forces (MCSOF) operations, detection and destruction of enemy submarines, air defense response to North Korean missile attacks, and tactical maneuvers.
The aircraft carrier visit was framed as a reaction to the DPRK’s “seventh nuclear test,” which, as the author has repeatedly noted, has long happened in the minds of US experts, but is still not happening in objective reality. First, it was given a new date at the backdrop of the exercise: “North Koreans are certain to detonate a bomb on the occasion of US Vice President Kamala Harris’s visit to the ROK.” But when it became clear this would not happen, South Korean intelligence reported on September 28, 2022 that North Korea could allegedly conduct a nuclear test between October 16 and November 7. It was also pointed out that, according to satellite images, North Korea has prepared an underground tunnel No. 3 for nuclear tests at its test site in Punggye-ri; moreover, that the bomb will be detonated after the PRC hosts the CPC Congress so as not to disturb the ally.
While there is no test, frightening new expert reports on North Korean military capabilities are being released. On September 27, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) published a report “Assessment of the Incremental Costs of DPRK’s Nuclear Tests and Analysis of the Strategic Implications.” By 2025, the DPRK will focus on full-scale mass production and deployment of nuclear warheads, and by the late 2030s will increase the number of warheads from “a few dozen to three hundred,” of which over 200 will be deployed on ICBMs and SLBMs, and about 100 on tactical-level missiles.
However, achieving this threshold in the short term is problematic due to the international sanctions imposed on the country and the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, but in the long term the goal will be achieved.
In another report by the US-based think tank Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, entitled “The Current Situation of North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons,” Pyongyang was given enough fissile material to make 45-55 nuclear weapons, of which 20-30 may already be in a completed state.
It was noted that although North Korea is developing SLBMs, there is currently no information about the deployment of the tested missiles of this type (Pukguksong-1/KN-11 and Pukguksong-3/KN-26). As for land-based missiles, the DPRK has launched quite a number of missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km since 2019, which can also be used as a means of delivering a nuclear warhead.
Among the medium-range missiles Pyongyang possesses are the Hwasong-7, the Hwasong-9 and the Pukguksong-2. The latter, if placed on alert, is designated as a significant regional threat because it can carry both conventional and nuclear warheads.
Regarding assessments of the latest Hwasong-17 ICBM, experts are rather skeptical – the North Koreans have failed to conduct a successful launch that could be reliably verified and validated. As with the Hwasong-15, there is currently insufficient evidence to suggest that the two North Korean ICBMs are capable of withstanding re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere.
It is acknowledged that the DPRK has nuclear warheads for medium- and long-range missiles, which is not the clear case for compact warheads – tactical nuclear weapons.
At the same time, another series of satellite images of North Korea’s Sinpo shipyard has surfaced, which once again led to conclusions that the North Koreans have finally launched (or are about to launch) a submarine capable of carrying multiple SLBMs. The evidence is a cluster of vessels at the submarine construction jetty, and a towing device attached to the dock. In addition, images show a large launch container for a missile with a diameter of 1.8 meters, which exceeds the dimensions of Pyongyang’s earlier SLBMs Pukguksong-1 (1.1 meters) and Pukguksong-3 (1.4 meters).
However, this long construction has lasted for several years (construction of the submarine was started in 2016), so the author finds news every 4-6 month s that the submarine is about to be launched, as something has changed in the images. But if the North Koreans have finally done so, it enhances their combat capabilities, because even if such a submarine carries 3 or 4 missiles, the mere fact of its existence is enough to increase Pyongyang’s enemies’ problems.
As for the more obvious North Korean responses, the DPRK launched a short-range ballistic missile from Taechon, North Pyongan Province, towards the waters of the Sea of Japan on September 25. The previous launch, it may be recalled, took place on June 5, when the DPRK launched 8 short-range missiles at once.
South Korea convened an emergency meeting of the National Security Council on the matter, which condemned the launch as “a clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions and a provocation that increases tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region.” Japan also protested.
The distance between Taechon Airport and Port of Busan is about 620 kilometers, according to Kim Dong-yup, professor at the University of North Korean Studies. If the North had launched the missile towards Busan rather than into the Sea of Japan, the missile could have reached the aircraft carrier.
On September 26, speaking at the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, DPRK Permanent Representative to the UN Kim Song said, “the security environment of the Korean Peninsula is now caught in a vicious cycle of tensions and confrontation due to the growing hostility of the United States.” On September 28, 2022, North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan from Sunan Air Base near Pyongyang. According to the JCS of the ROK, the missiles covered a distance of 360 kilometers after reaching a maximum altitude of 30 kilometers at a maximum speed of Mach 6.
On September 29, North Korea launched two more short-range ballistic missiles towards the Sea of Japan. The JCS of the ROK said the missiles were launched using mobile launchers from Sunan Air Base near Pyongyang and flew about 350 km, reaching a maximum altitude of 50 km at about Mach 5. The experts in the ROK believe it could be a KN-25 large-caliber MLRS.
On October 1, two more short-range ballistic missiles dropped outside Japan’s exclusive economic zone near the eastern coast of the DPRK into the Sea of Japan. The missiles had an approximate range of 350 km, an altitude of 30 km and a speed of about Mach 6.
Thus, for the first time in history, the DPRK conducted four weapons tests in one week.
However, it should be remembered that against the background of the DPRK’s launches, some of which took place after the US and ROK joint exercise had already ended, the exercise “on the southern side” did not stop.
On September 28, the US Special Operations Command conducted an airport occupation and hostage rescue exercise for US and ROK special operations forces at Camp Humphreys airfield. In addition to the main tasks, the exercise included night landing, air support, surgical strikes, and taking control of the area of operations.
On September 30, a trilateral joint ROK, US and Japanese anti-submarine exercise was held in the Sea of Japan to jointly track a North Korean SLBM-equipped submarine, the role of which was played by an Annapolis nuclear-powered submarine. The last such exercise was held on April 3, 2017. The South Korean destroyer Munmu the Great, the aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan and its strike group, and the Japanese Asahi-class destroyer participated in the exercise.
Moreover, according to Austin Galligos, Spokesman for the US Marine Corps Command in South Korea, the ROK and US Marines have prepared a five-year plan to expand their joint exercises. The plan calls for more joint training as well as large-scale maneuvers. As part of this strategy, large-scale Ssang Yong exercise, which was discontinued in 2018, will resume from 2023.
What does all of this amount to? Yoon Suk-yeol has repeatedly said that military cooperation between the ROK and the US, especially in the form of joint exercise, should be strengthened. Some believe that in this way Yoon is trying to turn the focus of military cooperation towards action against the North, which would in any case “bare its teeth,” rather than engaging in anti-China military alliances. On the other hand, such exercise trigger the traditional vicious cycle of exchanging power demonstrations that are not conducive to reducing regional tensions.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, leading research fellow at the Center for Korean Studies of the Institute of China and Modern Asia, the Russian Academy of Sciences, exclusively for the online magazine “New Eastern Outlook.”