The agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan responds not only to military threats but also reflects the ambitions, concerns, and rivalries of both signatories and non-signatories. Beneath its formal collective defence language, the pact signals a broader geopolitical contest to shape the Middle East as the US-centered security system declines.
“Muslim NATO” — or strategic hedging?
Several experts consulted consider the “Islamic NATO” label premature. Dr. Kristian Alexander, a regional security specialist in Dubai, views the agreement as a formalisation of existing bilateral security relationships into a coherent regional deterrence framework, rather than the creation of a “Muslim NATO.” Seyed Mojtaba Jalalzadeh, an Iranian independent researcher and political analyst, also describes the pact as neither a fully developed Islamic NATO nor a symbolic gesture, noting that the specific military commitments of the three members remain undisclosed.
A competing interpretation exists. Muhammad Abdullah Ijaz, a Pakistani political analyst specialising in European foreign policy, transatlantic relations and Iran’s foreign policy, sees the pact as a possible step toward a “Muslim NATO,” citing its collective-defence principle’s similarity to NATO’s Article 5. However, Ijaz emphasizes that the agreement is defensive, the Pakistani nuclear umbrella was not explicitly included, and it should not be viewed as a sectarian Sunni alliance against Iran.
The sectarian dimension remains relevant. Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan are Sunni-majority states, while Iran is the region’s principal Shi’a power. Jalalzadeh notes that the pact unites “major Sunni-majority regional powers,” but emphasizes strategic hedging rather than sectarian competition. This approach allows the three countries to build autonomous deterrence while maintaining their relationships with Washington.
This distinction is significant. The pact can strengthen deterrence against Iran without forming an explicitly anti-Shi’a bloc, and it can increase pressure on Israel without becoming an overtly anti-Israeli alliance. Mohammad Khatibi, an Iranian foreign-policy analyst and broadcast journalist, considers Israel an underestimated factor in the pact’s strategy, describes Iran as an indirect concern, and identifies the Houthis as a practical issue, especially for Saudi Arabia and Red Sea security. Ali Mohebi, an Iranian political analyst specialising in European foreign policy, transatlantic relations and Iran’s foreign policy, argues that while Saudi Arabia focuses on the Axis of Resistance and Pakistan on India, Israel’s actions affect all three countries and may be the pact’s ultimate target.
Ambiguity may be a diplomatic advantage. Each member can interpret collective defence based on its own threat perception while maintaining that the agreement is defensive and not directed against any specific country.
Saudi Arabia’s bid for the regional centre
For Riyadh, the pact represents a bid for regional leadership, and a hedge for U.S. failure in security guarantees.
Jalalzadeh situates Saudi Arabia’s role within a broader strategy of strategic autonomy. He assesses that Riyadh seeks alternative or complementary security layers to reduce exclusive dependence on external guarantees, while maintaining its relationship with Washington. Alexander similarly thinks that Middle Eastern powers increasingly believe they must develop their own deterrence capabilities rather than rely solely on external actors.
Saudi Arabia’s central position in the pact is intentional. The arrangement combines Saudi financial resources, strategic geography, defence procurement capacity, and political influence with Türkiye’s large military, NATO experience, and advanced defence industries, and Pakistan’s military strength and nuclear capability. Jalalzadeh identifies this complementarity as a key feature of the agreement.
The result is a potentially valuable division of labour. Riyadh provides financial resources, political influence, and strategic geography; Ankara contributes defence technology, operational experience, and NATO interoperability; Islamabad offers military manpower, strategic expertise, and nuclear capability. The pact enables Saudi Arabia to build a regional security framework that connects its resources to two distinct forms of hard power.
There is a deeper Gulf calculation. Jalalzadeh argues that Saudi Arabia operates in a complex environment where Israel and the UAE have developed close strategic and technological cooperation, giving Abu Dhabi significant influence in Washington. He sees Riyadh’s actions as an effort to construct its own security axis and to position Saudi Arabia, rather than the UAE, at the centre of the regional security debate.
This makes the Mecca pact more than an Iranian deterrent. It is also a Saudi effort to influence leadership in the post-American and increasingly multipolar Gulf security order.
Türkiye and Pakistan: two different strategic calculations
For Türkiye, the agreement offers another platform for Ankara to project power beyond its traditional NATO framework.
Türkiye’s deteriorating relationship with Israel (“Türkiye is the next Iran,” as an Israeli leader has told) and its expanding defence industry are key factors. Turkish drones, air-defence systems, and military technologies have become important foreign policy tools, enabling Ankara to transform industrial capacity into geopolitical influence.
For Pakistan, the equation is different.
Islamabad gains prestige and strategic depth by becoming a central pillar of a security arrangement with Saudi Arabia and Türkiye. However, Pakistan’s main strategic rival is India, which limits its willingness to prioritize Middle Eastern conflicts over its South Asian interests.
This divergence among the three members may in the end dwarf their shared religious identity.
Khatibi notes precisely this problem: Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan do not have identical threat perceptions, making a unified military response more complicated than the collective-defence language might suggest.
The pact therefore connects three powers but it does not necessarily give them one geopolitical agenda.
Egypt’s absence may be the most revealing part
The missing fourth member is arguably as important as the three signatories.
Egypt participated in the R4 framework with Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. At their fourth consultative meeting in Cairo on June 21, the four foreign ministers reaffirmed continued consultation and coordination on regional peace, security and stability.
Yet Egypt did not enter the final defence pact by Saudi pressure.
The experts consulted offer competing explanations: Cairo’s preference for strategic flexibility; different priorities around Libya, Sudan, Gaza, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal; tensions with Türkiye; its peace treaty with Israel; and its close relationship with Washington and UAE.
Dr Nadia Helmy, an Egyptian expert on Chinese politics, emphasises Cairo’s desire to preserve political and military independence and avoid binding alliances that could restrict sovereign decision-making.
Jalalzadeh adds economic weakness and Egypt’s differing strategic priorities.
But there is now an important contradiction worth investigating further. Current reporting says Saudi Arabia itself opposed Egypt’s inclusion despite Turkish efforts to bring Cairo into the pact.
That would change the interpretation considerably, as it places Riad at the driver’s seat.
From Washington’s umbrella to a multipolar Middle East
The United States remains the invisible fourth participant in the pact. However, for the increasing anxiety of Israel, Trump has given his blessing: “I am very pleased with the signing of the Mecca Defense Agreement.”
Throughout the interviews with the experts, Washington appears in various roles: as guarantor, as a declining power, as a partner, and as a security provider whose reliability is increasingly questioned and damaged.
It is difficult to imagine that the US was unaware of negotiations involving Saudi Arabia, a major American security partner; Türkiye, a NATO member; and Pakistan, which retains longstanding military ties with Washington and the main mediator in the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict.
The more interesting question is therefore not whether Washington “approved” the pact, as it was the first speculations. It is whether Washington needs to oppose it – and Washington didn’t, as Trump sees it as a way to press Israel to abide to the MoU with Iran and to his Gaza Peace Plan.
Dr Helmy’s analysis of the Chinese perspective is particularly relevant. Beijing views the agreement as evidence of declining confidence in American security guarantees and as an opportunity for regional states to diversify away from Washington.
On the other hand, this does not make the pact pro-Chinese, nor does it render Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, or Pakistan anti-American. It demonstrates that multipolarity can develop without countries formally changing alliances.
India is also a factor. Pakistan’s participation gives the agreement a South Asian dimension, while China’s strategic and economic ties with Pakistan gives further complexity. The pact thus extends beyond the Middle East into the Arabian Sea, South Asia, and the broader Eurasian strategic system.
The result, as put by Seyed Mojtaba Jalalzadeh, is a geopolitical triangle with significant reach: Saudi Arabia links the Gulf and Red Sea, Türkiye connects the Middle East to the Mediterranean, Eurasia and Europe, and Pakistan extends the network into South Asia and the Arabian Sea.
The Mecca pact is consequently best understood not as the birth of a “Muslim NATO”, but as one of the clearest expressions yet of a Middle East in which regional powers are attempting to build overlapping security networks of their own.
In the end, this may be its greatest significance.
Ricardo Martins – Doctor of Sociology, specialist in European and international politics as well as geopolitics
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