The Lowy Institute Poll 2026 provides clear evidence of shifting attitudes. Sixty-one percent of Australians now view China primarily as an economic partner rather than a security threat.
A Public Turning Pragmatic
The Lowy Institute Poll 2026 provides clear evidence of shifting attitudes. Sixty-one percent of Australians now view China primarily as an economic partner rather than a security threat. Trust in the United States has fallen to a record low of 31 percent, while trust in China has risen to 28 percent. Only 45 percent of respondents consider the relationship with Washington more important than the relationship with Beijing.
These results reflect more than short-term dissatisfaction. They indicate that a significant portion of the Australian public is reassessing the costs of consistently subordinating economic interests to strategic alignment with the United States. Australians are not calling for the abandonment of the American alliance. They are, however, increasingly reluctant to accept a foreign policy that places economic considerations below strategic loyalty to Washington.
Economic Reality vs. Strategic Posture
China remains Australia’s largest trading partner by a substantial margin. Bilateral trade exceeds 300 billion Australian dollars annually, and key sectors of the economy — iron ore, liquefied natural gas, and agriculture — remain heavily dependent on Chinese demand. The removal of most Chinese trade barriers in 2025 brought measurable relief to Australian exporters and contributed to the recovery of export revenues.
Despite this economic reality, the Australian government has continued to deepen its security integration with the United States. The AUKUS program remains a central priority, participation in the QUAD continues, and intelligence cooperation within the Five Eyes framework remains unchanged. Canberra has pursued a policy of compartmentalization: economic engagement with China is accepted, while security policy stays firmly within the American strategic framework.
This approach is becoming harder to sustain. The Lowy data suggests that the public is less willing than the government to accept the costs of keeping security policy insulated from economic realities.
The Limits of Australia’s Strategic Autonomy
Australia’s close alignment with the United States has reduced its strategic flexibility. By embedding itself deeply in the AUKUS framework and the broader American-led security architecture, Canberra has limited its capacity to pursue an independent policy toward China. Every significant step in relations with Beijing must now be evaluated through the lens of its potential impact on the alliance with Washington.
This has gradually created a relationship of growing strategic dependence rather than one of fully equal partnership. The United States retains the initiative in defining the strategic direction, while Australia bears much of the economic and diplomatic friction generated by heightened tensions with China. In an increasingly multipolar international environment, hedging offers middle powers greater strategic flexibility than rigid alignment.
The Divide Between Society and Elites
The Lowy Institute data highlights a growing divergence between Australian society and its political and strategic elites. While the public has moved toward a more pragmatic assessment of the China relationship, the government continues to treat the American alliance as the non-negotiable foundation of Australian foreign policy.
This divergence carries practical consequences. As public support for a more balanced approach toward China increases, the government will face growing difficulty in maintaining its current level of alignment with Washington without domestic political costs. The 2026 poll serves as a clear signal that a significant part of the electorate no longer shares the elite consensus on Australia’s positioning between the two major powers.
A more pragmatic policy would not require abandoning the American alliance. It would require treating the alliance as one instrument among others, rather than as the overriding framework for all decisions. In a multipolar world, hedging remains the more rational posture for a middle power than rigid alignment.
Conclusion
The gap between Australian public opinion and government policy reflects a structural tension that is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. The public has begun adapting to the realities of a multipolar order, in which deep economic interdependence with China and close security cooperation with the United States are no longer easily reconciled. The government, for now, has not adjusted to this shift.
The Lowy Institute Poll 2026 makes one point clear: unquestioning alignment with Washington is facing growing domestic pressure in Australia. How Canberra chooses to respond to this pressure will be a defining feature of its foreign policy in the years ahead.
Adrian Korczyński, Independent Analyst & Observer on Central Europe and global policy research
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