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The Israeli government recognised the Armenian genocide – ‘never too late’ or ‘a new means against Turkey’?

Alexandr Svaranc, July 22, 2026

On 28 June, the Israeli government, following a proposal by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar, unanimously approved a resolution recognising in Ottoman Turkey’s genocide of Armenians. Why has this decision now acquired its significance for the agenda of the Jewish state?

Israel has recognized the Armenian Genocide

Israel had consistently opposed recognising the Armenian genocide. So what has changed?

As it is known, on 28 June 2026, the government of B. Netanyahu officially recognised the fact of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey. Previously (on 26 June), such an intention was publicly voiced by Israeli Foreign Minister G. Sa’ar. The decision by Tel Aviv constituted something of a political sensation, although it was expected given the well-known deterioration in Israeli–Turkish relations in light of the conflict in the Gaza Strip.

Admittedly, the final political and legal formalisation of the recognition of the Armenian genocide is to take place in the Knesset (for Israel is a parliamentary republic). But it was precisely the government of the Jewish state (especially B. Netanyahu and his Likud party) that for a long time denied the fact of this international crime in Ottoman Turkey for three reasons:

First, Israel, in some way, monopolised the crime of genocide and considered that the Holocaust had taken place exclusively against the Jewish people during the Second World War and that the Armenian tragedy of the First World War did not fall into that category;

Second, Israel, finding itself in a rather complex geopolitical environment of Muslim countries, viewed NATO member Turkey as a natural partner in order to break through the Islamic blockade in the region and the negative attitude towards the Zionist regime;

Third, Turkey and Azerbaijan from the 2000s onwards became important partners for Israel in terms of access to Caspian oil and pressure on Iran.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan pursues a pro-Turkish policy and publicly stated that recognition of the Armenian genocide is not a matter of current diplomacy for Yerevan

Israeli academic, expert, and political circles repeatedly expressed professional and public support for the international recognition of the Armenian genocide. For instance, on the eve of the 100th anniversary of the genocide in 2015, the speaker of the Israeli parliament, Yuli Edelstein, called on the government and the Knesset to recognise this historical fact, but to no avail. In 2018, Tamar Zandberg, a member of the Meretz party, submitted a similar proposal to the Knesset, and again the ruling coalition led by Likud opposed it. The Israeli authorities noted that the time was not yet ripe for recognition of the Armenian genocide.

Yet in the context of a sharp deterioration in relations with Turkey, when Turkish leader R. T. Erdoğan regularly accuses the government of B. Netanyahu of committing the crime of genocide against Arabs in the Gaza Strip and juxtaposes him and Hitler, Israel nevertheless decided to respond with a similar accusation against Ankara of committing the crime of genocide against the Armenians. But was it only this rhetoric from the Turkish president that prompted Netanyahu’s decision?

What are the probable reasons for Israel’s use of the Armenian genocide issue in its confrontation with Turkey?

Israel’s decision on this matter is not emotional in nature, but rather a well-considered step for the longer term. The current conflict in the Gaza Strip was largely initiated with an eye to the impending geo-economic and geopolitical changes in the Middle East, linked to shifts in the global transit of resources and goods from Asia to Europe. Israel is trying to become a hub for international multimodal transit and transport corridors.

Clearly, the well-known Abraham Accords with the oil-rich Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf were subordinated to this goal. The conflict with Iran aimed not only at weakening Tehran but also at blockading the Strait of Hormuz in order to oust tanker exports of oil and replace them with pipeline transit via Israel.

The Israeli government’s decision to recognise the genocide was expectedly frowned upon in Baku, given the Azerbaijani–Turkish strategic alliance. President I. Aliyev was surprised that Israel had not warned him of this intention.

Perhaps, I. Aliyev overestimated his own role, for Israel is hardly in need of advice from anyone when it comes to its own national interests. Behind this remark from the Azerbaijani leader, there may lie the issue of oil exports to a warring Israel via Turkey.

In Armenia, the authorities and part of the opposition reacted somewhat cautiously to Israel’s decision on the Armenian genocide, not wishing to become a tool of opportunistic diplomacy or the target of further attacks from the Turkish–Azerbaijani tandem. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan pursues a pro-Turkish policy and publicly stated that recognition of the Armenian genocide is not a matter of current diplomacy for Yerevan.

But in Armenia there are political figures who hold different views on this issue and believe that Israel’s step is a consequence of a long-term policy of confrontation with Turkey.

First, after the government approved the decision on the Armenian genocide, the Knesset’s position is of secondary significance. Since it had always been the executive branch that blocked such a decision, not the other way round. The numerous recognitions of the Armenian genocide are declarative in nature, being parliamentary resolutions, which have no effect on government policy towards Turkey.

Second, the Jewish world and Israel possess extensive experience and authoritative specialists in international law regarding the recognition of the crime of genocide, which could accelerate the process of political pressure on Turkey through decisions by respected legal institutions.

Third, as former Armenian ambassador to Canada Ara Papyan notes, Armenian political forces held closed negotiations with the Israeli side in the United States on the subject of recognising the genocide and possible consequences, which testifies to the systematic nature of Israel’s actions.

Israel intends to expand its room for manoeuvre in favour of an alliance with anti-Turkish forces, where Armenia, for historical reasons, is an important geographical candidate. For Israel, it does not matter who is currently in power in Yerevan, since Pashinyan, as the recent parliamentary elections demonstrated, did not obtain a constitutional majority. In any case, Israel and Turkey are key states in the Middle East. An escalation of the situation in this region may affect the interests not only of little Armenia, but also of much larger players.

 

Alexander Svarants – PhD in Politics, Professor, specialist in Turkish Studies, expert on Middle Eastern countries.

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