Seoul’s deepening ties with the EU and NATO, as well as recent statements made by President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Lee Jae Myung during foreign visits, suggest that by the end of 2026, South Korea may transition to direct military cooperation with Kiev.
Source: Yonhap
President Lee and EU Leadership
The DPRK’s response came on June 13 when the spokesperson of the foreign ministry called South Korea an “invariable enemy obsessed with confrontation,” comparing Seoul’s role in the East to Ukraine’s role in the West, dubbing the ROK an “accomplice of Ukrainian puppets.”
In response, the South Korean presidential administration clarified some points. According to Seoul, there are no discussions of a tightening of policy. The authorities stated that the wording regarding Russian-North Korean cooperation and the DPRK’s nuclear program merely reiterates the long-standing official position and is not a signal of a foreign policy shift.
President Lee and the NATO Summit
On July 7, 2026, in Ankara, President Lee Jae Myung took part in a meeting between the leaders of four NATO partner countries (South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand) and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.
On the sidelines of the Defense Industry Forum, Lee Jae Myung presented the Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0 initiative. It envisions a transition from one-off arms deals to deeper integration, including joint development, production, and operation of military systems. The South Korean President emphasized the technological superiority of the South Korean defense industry and its readiness to ensure sustainable supply chains for NATO needs.
Following talks with Mark Rutte, important agreements were reached:
Institutional framework: The parties are commencing work on a framework agreement that will allow South Korean companies to fully participate in NATO tenders.
Innovation: Seoul will be integrated into NATO’s ecosystem of innovation, where advanced military technologies are being tested considering experience gained in the Ukraine conflict.
Standardization: The issue of unifying defense standards is under discussion, which will be key to expanding the ROK’s access to the NATO arms market.
Subsequently, the presidential administration once again had to issue a statement, emphasizing that these steps do not mean that the Republic of Korea is joining NATO, but are aimed solely at enhancing the effectiveness of the existing partnership.
South Korean Economic Problems
According to Russian historian and journalist Oleg Kiryanov, for Lee Jae Myung, the NATO summit is first and foremost an arms business. South Korea’s economic difficulties are growing, and arms export earnings are becoming more important. NATO, meanwhile, is not only a military and political alliance but also the world’s largest arms market. In addition to how extensively the South Korean defense industry is moving into Europe, we may note that the more Seoul bets on arms trade as a way to solve its problems, the more its dependence on this sector grows. For instance, Canada recently rejected a South Korean submarine project in favor of a German one, and among future buyers, there is a growing feeling that South Korean weaponry must be impressively demonstrated in practice.
President Lee and Cooperation with Kiev
On the sidelines of the NATO summit, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung held a meeting with Vladimir Zelensky. The leaders discussed ways to bring about a swift end to the conflict, as well as measures to ensure peace and stability in the region. In addition, Lee reaffirmed Seoul’s readiness to take an active part in the postwar reconstruction of Ukraine.
On the basis of these agreements, Presidential National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac announced Seoul’s decision to allocate 100 million dollars to Kiev. This step is intended to demonstrate South Korea’s commitment to global security. It was also stated that South Korea wants to increase the volume of assistance to Ukraine for large-scale reconstruction of the country.
However, there is another, no less important aspect to this situation. Just as the participation of North Korean military personnel in the Special Military Operation gives Pyongyang the opportunity to study the realities of modern warfare, Ukraine seeks to offer Seoul a similar experience. Playing on South Korea’s concerns about the rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang, Kiev is prepared to share data (regardless of its reliability) on the specific features of the tactics and weaponry of the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
A taboo on contacts with Moscow?
While Seoul’s contacts with Kiev are rapidly growing, any ties with Russia remain under an unofficial ban. On June 26, the South Korean presidential administration officially denied reports of a meeting between National Security Adviser Wi Sung-lac and a high-ranking representative of the Russian government, which allegedly took place in late May in Kazakhstan.
Earlier, the newspaper Dong-A Ilbo, citing its own sources, claimed that closed-door talks had been held in Astana. In response, the presidential administration emphasized, “The purpose of the National Security Adviser’s visit to Kazakhstan was exclusively bilateral consultations with the Kazakh side. Seoul and Moscow maintain working contacts through embassies and diplomatic channels, as necessary, to ensure the stability of bilateral relations, as well as to protect the interests of citizens and businesses.”
Conversation with a Colleague
The inspiration for writing this text was a conversation with a South Korean colleague. We were discussing the prospects for restoring relations between our countries, but his forecast turned out to be far more pessimistic than mine. My interlocutor’s arguments boil down to the following:
In the ruling circles of South Korea, anti-Russian sentiments are strong, and they are actively fueled by the press (primarily Korean-language online publications). This process began with the start of the Special Military Operation, and the initiators were mostly representatives of the democratic camp.
Three factors contribute to this. Firstly, for the ordinary Korean, the conflict in Ukraine lies outside his mental map. He perceives the situation through a simplified lens, where a large authoritarian regime attacked a small democracy that overthrew a corrupt president and is building a new society. Secondly, over 90% of materials in local media are reprints from Western sources. An alternative point of view struggles to break through. The Russian embassy faces the fact that its rebuttals are simply refused publication. For instance, a number of English-language outlets in South Korea did not accept for publication an article by Ambassador Zinoviev about the tragedy in Starobelsk (it is available on the embassy’s website). Thirdly, during President Yoon Suk Yeol’s tenure, Democrats used the Ukrainian agenda as a tool for domestic political struggle, accusing the president of insufficiently defending democratic values.
As a result, over the past few years, public opinion in South Korea has firmly consolidated on the side of Ukraine. And going against it for a populist politician like President Lee is obviously a losing strategy.
…And How All of This Will Affect Relations Between Seoul and Moscow
It is clear that President Lee always says what his audience wants to hear, which is why his statements to different audiences differ significantly. However, all these statements, from condemnation of the Special Military Operation to not particularly subtle advertising of the ROK defense industry, are very reminiscent of what conservative Yoon Suk Yeol said at similar events – although there is one dangerous nuance. Yoon withstood pressure and demands to send weapons and ammunition to Ukraine and focused on military and technical cooperation between NATO and South Korea. But Lee Jae Myung turns out to be not an object, but a subject of influence, and in essence, he proposes to transform military-technical cooperation into military-political cooperation.
One gets the impression that difficulties in relations between Seoul and Washington are pushing South Korea toward cooperation with the EU/NATO, which is perceived as a more close and comfortable “democratic” partner.
Oleg Kiryanov believes that it is premature to speak of a complete reversal of Seoul’s policy, and they will not risk crossing one of the main red lines in relations with Moscow. It will be more likely to see deepening cooperation in the exchange of intelligence information or technology supplies than direct supplies of lethal weapons, especially since Wi Sung-lac confirmed that Seoul’s position on this issue has not changed; it still opposes such supplies. However, pressure on Lee is growing. Firstly, the growing cooperation between the DPRK and Russia is perceived (at least by part of the establishment) as a threat to South Korean security and a justification for symmetric actions. Secondly, future buyers of South Korean weapons would like proof of their effectiveness in a real war situation. Thirdly, Kiev has gained an additional reason for pressure. Fourthly, Lee does not possess Yoon’s stubbornness.
Lee may not openly cross the red line, but keeping in mind the strategy of the Democrats as a whole, one can expect stories reminiscent of the case (which is now completely absent from the news) of a certain group of enthusiasts who, with the support of the military and intelligence services, sent reconnaissance drones to the DPRK. The project will be outsourced to another group of enthusiasts or retirees, from whom they can either distance themselves or cover up the matter, and in the most unpleasant scenario, South Korean weapons and/or military specialists will appear in Ukraine before the end of this year.
The author writes this forecast in hopes that all the people who need to will understand the danger of moving in this direction and will make a different choice.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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