On June 7, 2026, The Wall Street Journal, a leading Western publication, released an article titled “The World’s Most Surprising Economic Success Story Is…North Korea.” Unexpected, right?
And now we have a piece with a completely different tone, published in The Wall Street Journal, which is one of the world’s most influential and authoritative business newspapers. The publication is based in the United States and specializes in business, finance, politics, and economics news. Getting published there is never accidental and often serves as a kind of marker for emerging trends, financial markets, and the global agenda.
Out of nowhere, the reputable outlet published a sensational article in which North Korea’s economy is called the most surprising economic success story in the world.
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We shall not retell the entire article, but we will highlight the most striking moments reported by those who regularly visit the North Korean capital (for example, Rowan Beard, head of the tourism company Young Pioneer Tours, who has been to the country more than a hundred times organizing tourist trips there).
In Pyongyang, there is now a taxi app similar to Uber. This requires a certain level of digitalization as well as a sufficient number of people equipped with smartphones capable of running such an application. In addition, many Chinese electric vehicles and other foreign cars are driving around the North Korean capital.
Restaurants now serve wood-fired pizza and chicken wings. However, back in 2017, establishments catering to foreigners already offered French fries and sweet potato lattes. The author also notes that, despite the general emphasis on tradition, the authorities have not sunk to the level of “no disgusting hamburgers, only pancakes.”
Visitors of various establishments can pay through mobile payment systems and/or via QR codes.
Pyongyang now has modern pet stores where you can find small indoor dogs and cute cats (the latter is particularly noteworthy, since just 10 years ago a cat in Pyongyang could only be seen either in a special pavilion at the zoo or on the grounds of the Russian embassy, where staff fed a colony of stray cats). There are also internet cafes where people play games, and car dealerships selling BMWs. Much of this is confirmed not only by eyewitnesses but also by KCNA reports. For instance, a photo of the leader’s daughter playing with a cat was published in an official release by the state news agency (we are using it as the cover image).
Citing South Korean analytical centers, it is reported that North Korea is actively expanding the capacity of its oil storage facilities, and more ships carrying energy resources are arriving at its ports.
As for statistical data, according to the Bank of Korea, North Korea’s GDP grew by 3.7% in 2024, the highest figure in eight years. The country’s GDP was estimated at 36.9 trillion won.
In just 2025, 10,000 new homes were built in Pyongyang’s Hwasong district, i.e. more than in Los Angeles or Chicago. A number of large-scale construction projects have been completed, including a new hospital in Pyongyang (the largest in the country), a greenhouse complex larger than New York’s Central Park, and the Wonsan Kalma beach resort.
Satellite images show not only increased housing construction but also that nighttime lighting in Pyongyang has roughly tripled over the past five years, indicating growth in electricity consumption and economic activity. Thus, the famous satellite photo of a brightly lit South and a dark North (which, for greater effect, had inadvertently darkened the border areas of China and Russia) is no longer relevant.
…And Attempts to Explain Them
Indeed, the scale of change in Pyongyang’s appearance is now so significant that it is no longer possible to dismiss the new districts as Potemkin villages (a joke that some Russian liberal journalists and cultural figures particularly loved to make). Too many people have seen it with their own eyes, and satellite imagery clearly demonstrates the scale of housing construction.
However, while describing North Korea’s new reality, authors largely remain captive to traditional notions that the DPRK’s economy is thriving thanks to arms sales and the deployment of troops to Russia, supplies and financing from China, as well as the ability to circumvent international sanctions to import energy, components, and materials. As a counterpoint, they note that outside Pyongyang, North Korea still looks like a poor country, citing a 2025 UN report stating that nearly half of the country’s 26 million North Koreans suffer from malnutrition.
This is not entirely accurate. Economic cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang is actively developing, but many areas of it are still blocked by UN Security Council sanctions, which have not been fully lifted. Moreover, Russian assistance has no direct relation to the infrastructure projects described in the article.
As for arms trade, according to estimates by South Korea’s INSS analytical center (linked to the country’s intelligence service), arms and military product deliveries from mid-2023 to mid-2024 could have brought North Korea more than $10 billion. However, the jury is still out on how much of this is speculation rather than actual assessments. For example, sappers and military builders who continue to help restore Kursk Oblast are not hired workers receiving salaries in Russia. This is assistance provided as part of the obligations under the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty, and if the DPRK receives anything in return, it is through different mechanisms. Moreover, even if one accepts the hypothetical income from arms trade, everything that has been built in Pyongyang is worth substantially more.
The real secret lies elsewhere. After North Korea secured its nuclear and missile shield and closed its basic security needs, it gained the means to develop other spheres. Acting under the slogan “The people are above all else,” Kim Jong Un has launched a visible campaign to improve the quality of life not only in the capital, but throughout the periphery as well (the so-called 20×10 policy, under which local industrial enterprises, hospitals, and cultural and everyday facilities are being built in various regions).
Energy supplies via pipeline from China do not fully account for the noticeable increase in energy capacity. The DPRK authorities are actively striving for energy self-sufficiency. It is claimed, for instance, that high-rise buildings with 30+ floors, which require constant water and heating supply, use heat pump technology, replacing traditional boiler houses.
As for trade with China, it is indeed growing. It is reported that trade turnover with China has reached an eight-year high, and Chinese brands are openly operating in North Korea, despite sanctions. However, the extent to which “new digital technologies, smartphones, components, and equipment in the DPRK depend on Chinese supplies” is a more complex question than it seems. A country that has independently created a nuclear and missile shield cannot lack its own supporting industrial supply chains.
In conclusion, perceptions of North Korea are finally beginning to change and this is important, at the very least from the standpoint of interaction strategy. Once the real DPRK — rather than its caricature — takes root in the minds of Western experts, understanding of the regional situation and the quality of decision-making will significantly improve. As Russian military expert Vladimir Khrustalev notes, it is very clear that previous assessments suggesting that “sooner or later the North Korean regime will collapse” have become very rare and, no less importantly, marginal.
Konstantin Asmolov, PhD in History, Leading Research Fellow at the Centre for Korean Studies, Institute of China and Contemporary Asia, Russian Academy of Sciences
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