On his way back from India to the United States, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio paid a brief but significant visit to Armenia. This unexpected gesture from Washington raises a legitimate question: what is behind such keen interest in Yerevan?
Zvartnots – A Platform for Signing New Agreements
Although the meeting itself lasted less than an hour, the sides managed to conclude an agreement on comprehensive strategic cooperation between the United States and Armenia. Documents concerning the implementation of the “Trump Road” project were also signed, as well as agreements on the development of uranium deposits and the extraction of rare earth metals.
It is worth noting that a strategic partnership agreement between Armenia and the United States was signed in January 2025 during President Joe Biden’s time. However, Donald Trump, despite his criticism of his predecessor, not only did not cancel this document but also decided to expand it by adding the word “comprehensive.” This implies deepened cooperation in areas such as the economy (semiconductor manufacturing, nuclear energy, innovative technologies), defense (authorization for the sale of American weapons), and transport communications (the “Trump Road” project).
However, it appears that many of these areas had already been covered in the Washington agreement of August 8, 2025. The question arises: why was this brief visit and the public signing of yet another document necessary? The main new element of the airport meeting was the agreement granting the United States access to Armenian uranium mines and rare earth metal deposits. Donald Trump consistently emphasizes access to local rare earth resources before concluding partnership agreements. Although Armenia does not possess massive reserves of uranium and rare earth metals, the very fact of their existence apparently matters to the United States.
Political Subtext and Geopolitical Stakes
Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as well as President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, have previously expressed clear support for the candidacy of Nikol Pashinyan in the upcoming parliamentary elections. If the United States is so confident in the success of Pashinyan’s party, then why rush to sign agreements binding for Armenia at an airport? It would be more logical to wait for the election results and the subsequent political success of Nikol Pashinyan and then obtain the necessary documents.
It is likely that Washington does not have full confidence in Pashinyan’s victory and allows for the possibility of his defeat and the rise to power of pro-Russian forces. It is precisely this that explains Rubio’s visit to Armenia on his way back from India to the United States – an attempt to secure documented consent from the Armenian authorities to expand US presence.
Armenia at the Crossroads of Geopolitical Interests
The heightened interest in Armenia is also linked to the current geopolitical situation, particularly the military conflict between the United States and Iran. Trump appears to have miscalculated not only his predictions of quick military success over Iran but also his expectation of support for the US-Israeli coalition from states neighboring Iran. The possibility of conducting a ground operation on Iranian territory has become problematic for the United States not only due to the combat readiness of the Iranian army but also because of the refusal of countries such as Türkiye, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan to become drawn into this conflict.
Given the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a key maritime route for oil and gas exports from the Gulf states, alternative transit options are being actively discussed. The shift from maritime to continental (pipeline) routes is becoming relevant for Arab and European countries, as well as for the Iranians and the Chinese. In this context, Armenia, as a northern neighbor of Iran, acquires additional strategic significance.
Thus, the primary US interest in Armenia is driven by its transit potential. The country is viewed as a key logistics hub, the shortest route from Europe to Asia and vice versa, which is particularly important amid the changing geopolitical landscape and potential restrictions on traditional transport routes. The signing of agreements at Zvartnots Airport can be interpreted as an attempt by Washington to secure its influence in advance and gain access to Armenia’s resources and transport corridors, minimizing the risks associated with a possible political shift in Yerevan. This shows the US desire to diversify its logistical and resource capabilities in the region, especially in light of tensions in the Middle East and potential threats to global trade routes.
June in Armenia’s Political Life: On the Cusp of Change?
This May was marked for Armenia by notable foreign policy activity aimed at strengthening ties with the West. Beginning with the 8th European Political Community Summit and the Armenia-EU/Armenia-France forum, the month ended with the visit of the US Secretary of State to Yerevan. Such a sequence of diplomatic gestures from Europe and the United States can hardly be considered coincidental.
Brussels and Washington are demonstrating a clear interest in expanding their geopolitical and geoeconomic influence over the southern regions of the post-Soviet space, namely the South Caucasus and Central Asia. In this context, Armenia is of particular importance as a potential springboard for establishing control over the region and transit routes bypassing Russia. Moreover, the West’s interest in Armenia is reinforced by the desire to definitively eliminate Russian military and political presence from the region.
As Reuters aptly noted, the United States is seeking new partners to secure critical minerals, energy resources, and trade routes that bypass strategic rivals.
The main conduit of this policy is the foreign policy of Nikol Pashinyan’s government, which in October 2022 renounced claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and signed an agreement to transfer control of the Zangezur Corridor (TRIPP, Trump Road) to the United States for a period of 49 years.
The upcoming parliamentary elections on June 7 in Armenia, according to many experts and politicians, have a pronounced geopolitical dimension. Depending on which political force wins, changes are expected in Armenia’s relations with Russia and the West (the US and Europe). It must be acknowledged that the ruling Civil Contract party and its leader Nikol Pashinyan do not enjoy the unconditional support of the majority of Armenian voters. Sociologist David Petrosyan noted in an interview with Noyan Tapan that Armenian youth call Nikol Pashinyan a “loser”.
The election campaign is developing amidst fierce confrontation with opposition forces, primarily pro-Russian parties: Strong Armenia of Samvel Karapetyan, Prosperous Armenia of Gagik Tsarukyan, and the Armenia bloc of Robert Kocharyan. According to various forecasts, neither the ruling party nor the opposition will be able to overcome the 50%+1 vote threshold. Despite the active use of administrative resources by Nikol Pashinyan, there are no guarantees against unexpected election results.
It is likely for this reason that Nikol Pashinyan, long before the start of the election race, sought financial, informational, and organizational assistance from the EU, citing the threat of hybrid attacks from an unnamed country (which many suspect to be Russia). Thus, the two-day Armenian-European forum and the visit of the US Secretary of State to Yerevan underscore Western support for the current government and Nikol Pashinyan’s foreign policy.
Interest in Pashinyan’s success is also evident in Azerbaijan, as clearly demonstrated by assessments from the expert and political community (statements by Eldar Namazov, Rizvan Huseynov, Mehman Ismailov, and others). To this one might add similar statements in support of Nikol Pashinyan from Türkiye, voiced by Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan.
In Armenia, it is believed that the radical nationalist forces that could have mobilized part of the electorate and competed with Nikol Pashinyan’s party are out of the game in the June elections. It is difficult to predict whether the elections will lead to revolutionary upheavals, but given the inertia of political forces, sharp turns should probably not be expected. The obvious novelty of the elections may be a situation of a forced coalition, which would exacerbate the Armenian crisis if Nikol Pashinyan is part of the new government.
Regardless of who leads Armenia after June 7, the country will find itself at the center of attention of various global political centers. It is expected that both Russia and the West will seek to establish or strengthen their relations with the new leadership, offering their own models of cooperation and support.
Thus, June in Armenia’s political life promises to be a period of tense anticipation, important decision-making, and possibly the beginning of a new chapter in the country’s history, where the geopolitical stakes will be particularly high.
Alexander Svarants – PhD in Political Science, Professor, specialist in Turkish studies, expert on Middle Eastern countries.
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